

# **Socio-political Changes in Iran**

## **(Qajar to Now)**

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### **Introduction**

A mood of change and an aspiration of nation building started in Iran at the time of *Fath-Ali Shah* (1797-1834) the second king of *Qajar* dynasty (1796-1925). This aspiration condemned in the defeat of Iranian side in Iran and Russian war but re-emerged in different forms afterward. Rejection of the whole religions and ideologies in the form of *Babism*, dissolution in the world system in the form of *Bahatism*, copying new institutions from western models in a form of westernization, and forbid foreign goods and stand on a native form of development in a series of Forbidden Movements were new socio-political streams emerged during *Mohammad Shah* (1834-1848), the third, and *Naser-ed Din Shah* (1848-1896), the forth king of Qajar. Babism and Bahatism weakened after several riots and clashes in different parts of Iran which caused execution of Ali Mohammad Bab and banishment of the other leaders of the movement and many of their adherents to Outman Empire at the beginning of Naser-ed Din Shah's reign (Zahed 1380 & 1381 AHS). Westernization remained as a powerful and mostly intellectual stream, and Forbidden Movement developed as the main stream of Iranian development movement and launched as a state after the Islamic Revolution.

This paper would likes to follow the main stream in a very general sense in order to show how this movement affect Iranian socio-political situation to the present time. Qajar era, *Pahlavi* period (1926-1979) and Islamic Republic time (1979+) are three sections of our social historical explanation.

### **A. Qajar Era**

Qajar dynasty started by *Agha Mohammad Khan* in 1792 and ended with *Ahmad Shah* in 1925. Fath Ali Shah, successor of Agha Mohammad Khan, was keen to re-escalate the glory of Iran of the time of *Sfavid* era (1501-1722) but his defeat in war with Russia ended all his ambitions. Iranian society consisted of two different strata at this period.

### **a. Social Stratification**

Sjoberg notes that the social stratification of the pre-industrial societies generally consisted of two classes: the upper class and the lower class. According to him, in most of the pre-industrial cities there is also a third group called 'out -castes' (Sjoberg 1960: 110). He believes that 'the privileged stratum in pre-industrial cities and their societies includes at the minimum the officials of the political, religious, and educational bureaucracies' (Sjoberg 1960, 118). The other occupational groups which could be included in the upper class, to varying degrees in different pre-industrial societies, are landlords, military elements and a few merchants according to Sjoberg (Sjoberg 1960: 120). The lower ranks of the religious and governmental structures are part of the commoner group. He adds: 'religious personnel, those who serve the commoners generally lack the highly valued objective criteria of class and are therefore part and parcel of the humbler group' (Sjoberg 1960: 121). Other elements of the lower class are: many merchants, the bulk of the artisanry, the handicraft workers, unskilled laborers, farmers, shopkeepers and peasantry (Sjoberg 1960: 121-123). Sjoberg counts the slaves, night-soil carriers, leather workers, butchers, many barbers, midwives, prostitutes, dancers, lepers, etc. as the out-castes of the pre-industrial societies (Sjoberg 1960: 133-134).

In the nineteenth century, Persia as a pre-industrial society did not follow the exact pattern explained by Sjoberg but its social stratification was not too distant from his classification. Having a monarchy system, the Shah was the head of the state and his family was at the top of the social hierarchy. His government and those who were attached to it were the other part of the upper class. Those religious leaders or ulama who were appointed by the government as *Imam Jomoa* (Friday prayer leader) or *Sheykh-ol-Islam* (head of the *shar'a* (religious jurisdiction) courts) could be classified as part of the upper class too. Some others, either from ulama or different ranks, who were married with one of the courtiers, were promoted to this class as well. Being the head of religious and educational organizations, the other ulama were keen to be considered as the common people. Most of the ulama often went so far as to call themselves *mellat* (the people) in their correspondence (Namdar 1373 AHS: 24). Adapting the classification of Sjoberg to the Iranian society of the time, those who were courtiers or who belonged to the government, especially the higher ranks of it, were considered as the upper class. The rest of the people, excluding out-castes, were the lower class.

### **b. Legitimacy of the State**

What gives a state legitimacy to rule over a nation? There are different answers to this question from different points of view. According to structural-functionalists the 'majority consensus' in a liberal and pluralist society offers this legitimacy. This consensus, for instance, can be caused by shared values (Johnson 1966: 32) or utilitarian consensus (Gurr 1970: ch.8). Marxist theories talk about coercive organizations being the 'backbone of the state'. For example, Lenin considers the police and army as the main instruments of the state power (Lenin 1975: 316). This stream of thought does

not consider any autonomy for the state and always interprets it as a representative of the dominant class.

In structuralist form of thinking the notion of state has become very important. For Althusser, as well as Poulantzas, 'the state comes to be seen as the centre of the social formation and the continued existence of capitalist relations of production' (Craib 1992: 169). According to this stream of thought, the state has 'relative autonomy' (Skocpol 1979: 27) and fulfils its role in two ways: most of the time by "ideological state apparatuses" which ensure that people do what the underlying structure demands', and some time by force: 'the army, the police, the "repressive state apparatuses"' (Craib 1992: 169). Some Neo-Marxist thinkers reject the causality of a single class to centralize power in the hands of the state. For instance, Therbon believes that the state is 'a materialized concentration of the class relations of a given society' (Therbon 1978: 34).

The above interpretations of state formulate the notion of state as appropriate to European or Western societies. In the case of Iran, which is our concern, the European feudalist or capitalist form of class struggle is not observable. The form of pluralist liberal type of legitimacy was not practiced, at least, during the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties either. Qajar rule on Iran was a tribal coercive one, and Pahlavi's rule was despotic too. Algar's interpretation of the position of the state after the Safavid era, which Shiism became the formal religion of the country, illustrates the situation at the time of our concern.

'It has been seen that Shi'i Islam denied legitimacy to secular power, and the occultation of the Imam removed all real authority from the sphere of this world. With the establishment of the Safavid state in 1501, the denial of legitimacy became partially obscured by the claim of the monarch to descent from the Imams and by the introduction of Sufi motives into the concept of ruler ship. At the same time, a body of Shi'i ulama emerged who, although equally deprived of ultimate authority, gradually acquired, through the exercise of a practical function, a de facto authority within the community. This development in their position was furthered by the fall of the Safavids and their replacement, after an interregnum, by the Qajars in the last quarter of the eighteenth century within the community.

'By the end of the interregnum, relations between the state and the ulama had been changed by two new factors. First, there took place an evolution in Shi'i fiqh which asserted the role of the mujtahid in directing the community and even in ruling it. One of the ulama, Shaykh Ahmad Ardabili, indeed reminded his monarch, Shah 'Abbas, that he was ruling over a "borrowed kingdom" (*mulk-i 'ariya*), but the ulama in the Safavid period did not openly contest the legitimacy of the state. Second, the establishment of Qajar rule presented the ulama with the spectacle of a state that made many of the same assumptions concerning the nature of royal power as had the Safavids but was itself deprived of the semi legitimacy provided by alleged descent from the Imams. The Qajars called themselves "Shadow of God" but the claim to divine appointment was only formal. Thus it might have been thought that some attempt would be made to justify, in religious terms, the claims of the state to the

allegiance of its subjects.

'In the new situation, however, a political theory to accommodate the state within the system of beliefs was still not developed. Such a theory was probably impossible: the ulama, having established their position as de facto regents of the Imams, could not then have allotted the monarchy a similar position. Without such a position the monarchy was bound to be regarded as illegitimate. The contradiction was seldom stated explicitly but was nonetheless the ultimate cause of most of the friction between the secular and religious powers throughout the nineteenth century' (Algar 1969: 21-22. Original italic.).

The nature of the authority of the state in Iran was basically coercive but not in the same manner as Lenin expounded. The state's power did not reach over all aspects of the life of the people but only extended to security matters, either internal (theft, robbery, homicide, riots) or external (on the occasion of wars and military interventions). There was not a widespread bureaucratic organization related to the state. Thus, it seems that the secular state was tolerated in Qajar Iran for fulfillment of security through its military and police force. The rest of the peoples' life activities were mostly conducted by the ulama according to the religious rules. The command of the state was not tolerated on occasions in which it attempted to extend authority beyond a security jurisdiction, of which the Tobacco Movement is one of them.

### ***c. Tobacco Movement***

One of the key chapters in the history of Iran opened with the establishment of the Safavid dynasty. The founder of the dynasty, *Shah Ismaeel-e Safavi*, was a Shiite Moslem and was honored for being a descendant of the Prophet. He announced Shiism as the official religion of the country. <sup>1</sup>

As Algar says:

'The elevation of Shi'ism to the status of national religion in Iran by the Safavids in the early sixteenth century brought a turning point in its history: it [Shiism] became finally and inalienably associated with Iran as its homeland and stronghold. It is also from the Safavid period onward that one may meaningfully talk about the existence of a body of Shi'i ulama. Yet one essential element of pre-Safavid Shi'ism survived to be passed on, after temporary obscurity, to the Qajar period and beyond: the necessary and inescapable illegitimacy of the state' (Algar 1969: 5).

From this time the Shiite ulama became one of the most influential elements of the socio-political elite of the country.

At the time of Fath Ali Shah, Shiism and the ulama's reputable position became more fixed with stabilization of the political system. Under the rule of Naser-ed-Din Shah Iranian international relations widened drastically and the ulama's attention to the political affairs increased. Naser-ed-Din Shah's period is well-known as the 'contracts era'. The two powers of the time, Britain and Russia, were competing for new contracts to gain greater economic concessions in different regions of the

country. The Tobacco Movement is the first instance of significant political intervention by the ulama, backed by the people, against one of those contracts. Regional and minor confrontation with other goods had taken place in the form of forbidding, but the Tobacco Movement was at the national scale the most powerful one. It influenced the whole national and international relations of the country and became one of the peak points of the socio-political history of the nation. This movement caused the people to become aware of their political power under the leadership of the ulama.

Naser-ed-Din Shah, signed a contract with Major Talbot from England in 1890 AD. According to Algar, 'The preliminary negotiations were completed in London during Nasir-ud-Din Shah's third visit to Europe in 1889, and in the spring of 1891, the agents of the British company to which the monopoly had been granted began to arrive in Iran. All rights concerning the sale and distribution of tobacco inside Iran, and the export of all tobacco produced in Iran, were vested in the Imperial Tobacco Corporation,' (Algar 1969: 206). The British company was called *Regei*. The agreement was for fifty years, under which the company was supposed to give £15,000 per year and one fourth of its annual profits to the Iranian government. Its income was free of taxation, and its imports and exports were exempt from any customs' tariffs and limitations. The estimated profit of the company was about £335,900 per year (Lambton 1987: 230).

With the signing of the contract, many English subjects went to Iran as Christian missionaries as well as company officials. The company established its offices in Tehran, the capital, and other big cities. Its office in Tehran was built in a strategic places position dominating the Shah's palace and the administrative buildings of the capital, rather like a fortress with its own armed guards (Madani 1361 AHS: 24).

The people, especially tobacco merchants who lost control of the trade, expressed their disagreement with the contract by writing to the Shah and complaining to their religious leaders. Naser-ed-Din Shah and his Prime Minister *Amin-os-Soltan* rejected all forms of protest, and forbade the people from acting against the covenant. They had received £40,000 for signing this agreement (Nahavandian: 14). Gradually, under the leadership of the local religious authorities, however, protests against the contract were initiated, especially in the large cities such as Tehran, Tabriz, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad.

*Ayatollah Shirazi* the *Marja'* (religious leader) of the vast majority of the Shiite Moslems wrote two letters to the Shah warning him of the colonial dangers of the contract. Faced with the rejection of his warnings by the Shah, Ay Shirazi forbade the use of tobacco in any form in early December 1891. Responding to this call by the religious leaders, people stopped the usage and the trade of tobacco. The trade system came to a standstill. The Shah attempted to persuade the ulama to lifting the ban. Having been paralyzed by the people's actions, the Shah agreed to the cancellation of the tobacco contract, and the government paid £500,000 as indemnity to the company (Zahed 1381: 116-118).

As people became aware of their political power in the course of the Tobacco Movement they tried

to use this authority to limit the kings power and push their country toward progress such as European nations. In this case they aimed for the Constitutional Revolution.

***d. The Constitutional Revolution:***

There is no exact date recorded for the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution, therefore the special social conditions which led to the revolution occurring will be reviewed here. Iran had failed in two wars with Russia (1813 and 1828) and had lost some of the northern parts of the country, and both Britain and Russia were in competition in attempting to gain more economic concessions from the Iranian government. Most of foreign nationals had the right of immunity from prosecution in Iran. Accordingly, if they had committed any kind of crime in the country, the Persian courts could not prosecute them. Furthermore, the Qajar Shahs were dictators and called themselves the Shadow of God. The financial situation of the government was weak and it was running the country using heavy loans. More than eighty per cent of the population were peasants living in the villages, and they were required to pay about forty kinds of taxes (Katouzian 1981). The people were treated harshly by the prime ministers, ministers and governors, and they did not have any political rights because of the dictatorship of the political system. On the other hand, the success of the Tobacco Movement made people conscious of their political power. The cultural and commercial contacts between Iranian society and European countries increased, as well, and, thereby, many of the Persians were informed of the Western social progress. The people urged the ulama, as their community leaders, to do something against the tyranny.

Using some pretexts, like a picture of *Naus* (a Belgian who was appointed as the head of the customs of Iran) attending a fancy dress party while wearing the religious dress of an Iranian clergyman, the leaders of the Revolution, the ulama, mobilized the discontented people. In their first attempts the unfinished building of the Russia Bank was destroyed and the market was closed on several occasions. Moreover, gatherings in the mosques served as demonstrations in opposition to the government and made the people more aware of the ideology of the Revolution through the speeches made by *voaz* (clergy speakers). Following two migrations and seeking asylum in two holy shrines: *Abdol Azim*<sup>2</sup> and Qom, the ulama, merchants and the people, finally, forced the political leadership, the Shah, to establish the parliament, for the first time in Iran in 1906 (Zahed 1381: 144-150).

After establishment of the parliament revolutionaries divided in to two adversary groups with the name of *Mashrote Khah* (with social democracy tendencies) and *Mashroe Khah* (with religious tendencies). Their friction caused the Constitutional Revolution not to be successful. An anarchy begun in the country and demand for a coup-d'etat for unification of the country raised among the people. *Reza Khan* a military man, backed by Britain, fulfilled this need in 1921.

## B. Pahlavi Period

Succeeding the reign of Qajar, Pahlavi dynasty was established in Iran in April 1926 by coronation of Reza Khan following his coup of May 1921 while he was the Minister of War (Katouzian 1982: 89-92). His intention was to build a new centralized nation-state called by him *Iran-e Nowin* (The New Iran). Reza Shah enforced a modernization program through his dictatorship, and he tried to oppress all traditional authorities and to build a powerful government.

### a. Social Stratification

As a military man, Reza Shah suppressed all local powers, such as landlords and tribes-leaders, and persecuted the religious authorities by limiting their administrative duties toward the people by the establishment of new educational and judicial systems. In an effort for the unification of dress in the country he even tried, although ineffectually, to change their special clothing. On the other hand, the religious leaders tried to built up their own educational system and avoid participation in politics in order to reduce the friction with the state. A new middle class emerged because of increase in the governmental officials and factory workers which was built in different parts of the country, but still state and the people were the two main strata.

### b. Marginalisation of Islamic Identity

Through his modernization plans, Reza Shah caused the religious organization to lose many of its roles and much of its formal authority. Algar describes the modernization programs of Reza Shah from the religious peoples' point of view: 'The sixteen years of rule by the first Pahlavi can fairly be described as a period of intense hostility to Islamic culture and institutions; what western authors have approvingly called "reform" and "modernization" was experienced by many - if not most - Iranians as a brutal assault on their culture, traditions and identity' (Algar 1991: 739). Change in the legal system of the country can be given as an example.<sup>3</sup> Reza Shah's intention was not to ban the ulama from the courts but to assure that supervision of the legal system was under the full control of his government.

He also imposed further cultural reforms to reduce the sphere of religious authority to the benefit of the new political realm. His reforms were as such: A) "In 1928, a law was passed providing for state examination of religious students and the licensing of religious teachers." B) "Taken further by a law in 1931 that provided for the establishment of a syllabus for all *madradas*." C) "In December 1928, Reza Shah promulgated (in imitation of Ataturk, his mentor in many such matters) the Uniform Dress Law." D) "Still more offensive to most of contemporary Iranian opinion was the compulsory uncovering of women which was decreed in a law promulgated on 7 January 1936 and enforced with considerable vigor." E) "Endowments Law of November, 1934 which gave the state wide discretionary power to intervene in the administration of the *auqaf* and assume functions formerly fulfilled by the ulama."

F) “Religious ceremonies, especially those connected with the commemoration of Imam Hossein's martyrdom at Karbala, were subject to harassment or outright prohibition.” (Algar 1991: 741-742. Original italics.).

Algar's conclusion is that “The whole Pahlavi enterprise was, moreover, under girded with the attempt to create a surrogate, state-sanctioned culture, based on a cult of modernism and ethnic nationalism, that was designed to destroy by attrition the cultural hegemony of Islam in Iran' (Algar 1991: 741-742).

### ***c. Second Pahlavi***

The Allies in the Second World War occupied Iran in August 1941, in order to backup the Russian front against Germany. They made Reza Shah to resign seventeen days later. He had no farther reputation among the people and was at the age of retirement and famed that recently became sympathetic to the German's policies. His son - Mohammad Reza (1942- 1979) - was appointed as the king of Iran. The southern part of Iran was under the control of Great Britain which had the monopoly of the oil industry of that region, and the northern part was under the influence of Russia. The two influential foreign powers in Iranian politics of the time were Great Britain and the Soviet Union, joined by the United States after the Second World War.

Oil was the major resource of the Iranian economy. The expulsion of Reza Shah's dictatorship brought a short period of freedom to the country. The active features of the National Movement emerged in this environment (Algar 1991: 744-745) (Madani 1361 AHS: 136-188). In this movement the antagonism was between the people who sought nationalization of the oil industry, belonging to Great Britain, and the Shah's government which was in favor of Great Britain and the USA's interest.

Non-involvement in political activities caused relatively moderate, but not necessarily supportive, treatment of the religious institution by Mohammad Reza Shah, as compared with his father's actions. For instance in response to the demand of the ulama, he removed the ban for *Moharram* (The first month of Lunar Islamic Calendar) ceremonies and prohibition of Islamic dress of women (hejab) at the beginning of his reign (Algar 1991: 745).

### ***d. The National Movement of Iran:***

As it was mentioned Great Britain had the monopoly of the oil industry of the southern part of Iran and oil industry was the major resource of the Iranian government. Iran's parliament, in its 14<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> rotation (1943-1953), was the main scene of efforts to nationalize the oil industry of Iran. Dr Mosaddeq and Ayatollah Kashani were two distinguished activists of this, mostly, parliamentary movement

Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States were the influential foreign powers in Iranian politics of the time. The United States through the government of Iran tried to gain the concession of



the oil industry of the northern part of Iran which the Soviet Union was also one of the concession-seekers. Due to Dr. Mosaddeq's activities against the contract, the parliament of Iran deprived the government of the right to grant any kind of concession in December 1944. Cancellation of the contract of the oil of the southern part of Iran with Great Britain was not supported by the other MPs at the time (Madani 1361 AHS: 143-145). *Qavam* as the prime minister of Iran (1945- 1947) signed a secret military contract with the United States and granted the monopoly of the supervision of the Iranian army to them. He also caused the Soviet Union's troops to leave the country (Madani 1361 AHS: 164). After him, six succeeding cabinets came and fell within three years, mostly due to Ay Kashani's opposition (Madani 1361 AHS: 167).

Ay Kashani was jailed and then banished to Lebanon. The pretext for his banishment was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Shah in February 1949 (Algar 1991: 745). Meanwhile, there was an effort to re-new the oil contract of 1933 with Great Britain for 32 more years (Madani 1361 AHS: 139). Minority members of the parliament, led by Dr. Mosaddeq, caused the parliament to be closed at the end of its 15<sup>th</sup> rotation by filibustering and procrastination, without any decision about the contract (Madani 1361 AHS: 177-178).

The new oil contract was presented to the 16<sup>th</sup> rotation of the parliament which was opened on 9 February 1950, by the Prime Minister *Mansoor* (Madani 1361 AHS: 181). Ay Kashani returned to the country on 10 June 1950, by permission of, the prime minister (Algar 1991: 745) (Madani 1361 AHS: 180). *Razmara* appointed as the new prime minister on 26 June 1950 (Madani 1361 AHS: 182). Ay Kashani arranged a big demonstration on 29 December 1950 in Tehran, asking for nationalization of the oil industry in its declaration (Madani 1361 AHS: 182). On 7 March 1951, Razmara was killed by a member of '*Fadaaian-e Islam*' (a religious movement) (Madani 1361 AHS: 185). On the following day the commission of oil in parliament, headed by Dr. Mosaddeq, approved the bill for the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran (Madani 1361 AHS: 186). The parliament and the senate ratified it on 15 and 20 March 1951, respectively (Madani 1361 AHS: 199).

The British government arranged a ban on Iranian oil, and complained to Lahe Supreme Court for nationalization of her company (Madani 1361 AHS: 208). Dr. Mosaddeq, who was appointed as the prime minister of Iran on 2 May 1951, defended the act of nationalization of the oil industry in the international organizations (Madani 1361 AHS: 220).

On 16 July 1952 Dr. Mosaddeq resigned because of not having the right of appointing the minister of war. The Shah assigned Qavam as the new prime minister and the parliament voted for him. Ay Kashani opposed the new government and led a movement against Qavam and in support of Mosaddeq. (Madani 1361 AHS: 233-237). On 20 July 1952, Qavam cancelled the parliament and ordered the arrest of Ay Kashani (Madani 1361 AHS: 239-240). On the next day there was a great demonstration in Tehran and several other big cities of the country. Clashes took place and the military troops withdrew (Madani 1361 AHS: 242-245). Qavam resigned and the Shah agreed with

Mosaddeq's conditions and appointed him as the prime minister.

On 21 November 1952 the Iranian National Oil Company was established (Madani 1361 AHS: 259). Mosaddeq asked for one year direct legislative rights from the parliament. Ay Kashani, the head of parliament, disagreed. Mosaddeq dissolved the parliament by a referendum on 3 August 1953.

On 15 August 1953, the Shah deposed Mosaddeq and appointed *Zahedi* as the prime minister. Mosaddeq ordered the arrest of Zahedi. The Shah went to Iraq, and then, onto Rome on 16 August 1953. Zahedi, through a CIA planned coup, arrested Mosaddeq and other leading personalities of the national movement. On 19 August 1953 Zahedi announced himself as the prime minister via a radio broadcast, and the Shah came back to the country (Madani 1361 AHS: 288-291).

#### ***e. New Despotism***

After the coup in 1953 (1332 AHS), Mohammad Reza Shah returned to power with the assistance of American consultants, and his powerful State Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), which made a 'reign of terror ... , especially with regard to the practice of military tribunals investigating 'political' offences, an abuse which continued down to the last days of the monarchy' (Hambly 1991: 264-265). The influence of the USA in the internal affairs of Iran steadily increased. Just as an illustration and for example, 'specialists from Harvard University, financed by the Ford Foundation, were recruited to assist in formulation of a third plan' (MacLachlan 1991: 624), that ran from September 1962 until September 1967.

#### ***f. The 15th of Khordad (5<sup>th</sup> of June) Movement:***

After the death of *Ay Borujerdi*, the Marja of the vast majority of the Shiites of the time, in 1961, it was supposed by the state that there would be little religious objection to the Shah's reforms. However, the uprising of the clergy against the 'provincial and district approval' of Alam's government opened a new battle front. According to the constitution of Iran those elected as provincial and district council members '1) should be faithful to the orthodox Islamic faith and should not have perverted beliefs; 2) should swear oath by the Holy Quran; and 3) women were prohibited from being candidates. They also did not have the right to vote' (IPO 1991: 33). On 16 *Mehr* 1341 AHS (8 October 1962), it was announced by the press that, according to the approval of Alam's cabinet, the members of the provincial and district councils could be from non-Moslem communities, and, therefore, were able to swear not only on the Quran but on any other 'Divine book'. According to the new provision, women were also granted the right to vote (Madani 1361 AHS: Vol. I, 375).

There was a movement in protest of these changes led by the established mojtaheds of Qom, Tehran and other big cities, supported by the ulama of Najaf. It was backed by the religious population of the country, leading the government to annul its approval. *Alam*, the prime minister, announced the cancellation in the mass media (Rowhani 1363 AHS: 141-216). This political movement lasted two

months, and intensified the religious community's concern about the political situation of the country.

After the resignation of *Amini*, who had been the prime minister of Iran from 1960 to 1962, the Shah himself had taken the responsibility of the direction of the government. He had appointed Alam to be the prime minister in *Tir* 1341 AHS (July 1962). On 9 January 1963, the Shah declared a new modernization plan which was called the 'White Revolution' or 'The Shah and The People's Revolution.' He announced a land reform, which had started under the administration of Amini, as one of the six principles to be approved by the Iranian population through a referendum.

Some of these reforms were contrary to the Islamic values and traditions of the country. For example, land reform contravened the principle of private ownership, and when it started to operate Ay Borujerdi had mentioned its contradiction with the religious rules to Amini's government. Moreover, it was considered, by some of the ulama and their followers, as a dictation of the 'west' and a basis for further political and cultural dependency (IPO 1991, 75-76). Thus, the religious community objected to the measures. The ulama, especially *Ay Khomeini*, a new Marja, began their complaints about the referendum and argued that it had no position in the formal legislation of the country. The Shah changed the name of the referendum to a national plebiscite, but according to Ay Khomeini, nothing had changed except the name. (Madani 1361 AHS: Vol. II, 14-15).

The Shah attempted to enforce his plan by all the available means; Ay Khomeini, also, tried to mobilize the whole religious institution and faithful Shiites against the reforms. Ay Khomeini directed the movement by banning the plebiscite at first, and, in the later stages, by denying the loyalty to the Shah and *Taqiye* (or hiding the opposition to the Shah's government). However, the movement was suppressed because of his arrest, and the arrest of other leading mojtaheds of the prominent cities of the country, active clergy, business fellows, university students, that were the other effective distributing agencies of the movement. The movement was also disorganized; the whole of the religious structure did not participate, and the protest was harshly crushed by killing between 4 to 15 thousands demonstrators, according to different reporters, on 15<sup>th</sup> of Khordad 1342 AHS (5 June 1963).

An active organization was constructed by Ay Khomeini's clerical retinue and his followers from the bazaar which became one of the main distributing structures of the Islamic Revolution. This organization had established under the supervision of Ay Khomeini and *Ay Milani*, as his representative, with the name of *Heiathay-e Moatalefe-ye Islami* (The Allied Islamic Association) (Madani 1361 AHS: Vol. II, 101). This institution was founded at the beginning of 1342 AHS (Spring 1963) (Badamchian 1374 AHS: 1) about the time of the 15<sup>th</sup> of Khordad Movement in Tehran and had branches throughout the country with the purpose of propagating and training people in Islamic ideology. It changed its targets to political and military actions after Ay Khomeini's exile to Turkey in 1964 (Madani 1361 AHS: Vol. II, 101).

**g. The Islamic Revolution of 1978-79:**

In the Islamic Revolution discrepancy shaped in the confrontation of the monarchy system against the idea of Islamic government. The slogan of "Death to this dictator" in the 15<sup>th</sup> of Khordad Movement converted into the "Down with the Shah" in the Islamic revolution; and the conflict between the Shah's secular reforms and the Islamic reaction in the previous movement changed to the opposition of the Shah as the symbol of monarchy with Ay Khomeini as the sign of an Islamic government.

Keddie, in search of the causes of the Islamic Revolution, speaks about a cultural diversity which was caused by the rapid modernization. She believes that 'rapid modernization from above, with increasing Western participation, helped to create "two cultures" in Iran: those with Western-style education and employment who mimicked Western ways; and the peasants, nomads, bazaaris, urban migrants, and ulama' (Keddie 1983: 11).

The roots of the Islamic Revolution are actually located in the 15<sup>th</sup> of Khordad Movement. The harsh oppression of the protesters at that time led the revolutionaries, especially Ay Khomeini, to think about the reasons for their collapse. The first problem seems to be the organization of the movement. The need for establishment of some organizations for the next movement was the first reaction of the religious community (Madani 1361 AHS: Vol. II, 101). The second aim was the presentation of an alternative political system, instead of the monarchy, as the governing body of the country which was prepared by Ay Khomeini in his thesis, 'Islamic Government', which played the part of the ideology of the movement.

The two above mentioned processes were going on side by side with the activities and changes enforced by the state in the direction of secular modernization, dictatorship and dependency which prepared the social context of the final appearance of the revolution. The Shah, being proud of crushing the religious community, continued the secular changes and modernization. His dependent dictatorship, aided by increases in oil revenues led to a kind of centralized-petrolic-despotism. The economic dependency of the nation on the oil made, according to Katouzian, a 'pseudo-modern petrolic despotism' which was not any kind of modern capitalism that was claimed by the Shah (Katouzian 1981: 266).

Alongside the modernization program, the Shah tried to make his political position stronger by his coronation ceremony in 1967, the luxurious commemoration of 2500 years of monarchy in Iran in 1971, and the formation of the single party, *Rastakhiz* (Resurrection) system in 1975 (Algar 1991: 754-755).<sup>4</sup> In further suppression of Islamic ideas even the Iranian solar calendar, which has the migration of the Prophet of Islam as its starting point, was changed to an imperial calendar based on the starting date of the monarchy of Iran by Cyrus in more than 2500 years ago.<sup>5</sup>

The religion and the religious community were marginalized by these changes, becoming more and more alienated by the enforcing reforms. The opposition emerged through the development of

the organization of the religious community, designed by the first circle of Ay Khomeini's followers from the religious structure and Bazaar, backed by the religious affiliation of almost the whole nation participated in the revolution. The hopes and expectations of Ay Khomeini's Islamic Government articulated the ambition of a new independent nation according to the national beliefs (i.e. Shiism) (Katouzian 1981: 346) (Rahnema 1990, 24-25). The Shah's Great Civilization was no longer attractive to the commoners and the traditional middle class because of their alienation and depressed values. This was the case for the modern middle class who, besides their Shiite affiliations, gradually, saw the mismanagement and extravagances of the rulers of the country from within the state's organization (Halliday 1979: 294). Therefore, by a single sign of 'political relaxation' which came from the state, the people pushed it back to its fall and voted for the establishment of the new regime.

The participants in the revolution were against the despotic regime that was not considering them the rightful members of the country. The Shah had changed the 'constitutional monarchy' to His Majesty's own 'Imperial System' (Katouzian 1981: 342). This was a factor causing the bitter feelings which united the Iranian population against the state. According to Rahnema: 'The revolution was the rebirth of a nation. A sense of national identity and pride that was the result of a common struggle prevailed. For once, this was the people's Iran and not the Shah's Iran. Nationalism, which was the Shah's monopoly during his international interviews, was now truly socialized. The world marveled at a relatively bloodless revolution, which was neither the result of a self-righteous army coup wanting to impose law and order to defend 'democracy', nor the result of 'generous' aid of one or another 'friendly' power. The people had imposed their will with the minimum destruction and blood-letting' (Rahnema 1990: 2-3).

### **C. Islamic Republic Era (1979- Now)**

Islamic revolution caused a suppressed national identity to reemerge. This identity was routed in the long history of Iran. In short: at the time of Safavid dynasty Shiism became the official religion of the country; at the time of the Tobacco Movement people became conscious about their religious political power, and at the time of 15<sup>th</sup> of Khordad Movement they made an organization which facilitated establishment of a religious state 15 years later, in 1979. The Islamic Revolution caused unification of the state and the people. So a hope for abolition of class differentiation in regard of power, wealth and prestige appeared. The people are looking for enactment of their religious values, among prominent ones of them fairness and justice, in this new regime. They want progress with respect to their religious values and norms.

For ten years Islamic Republic was engaged with inside and outside intimidations. Struggling for its international legitimacy, world accepted Islamic Republic as a new established regime after war with Iraq (1981-1989). From that time reconstruction of the country started. In the process of

reconstruction, growth was at the target of the government with the expense of justice. Thereby, an image of separation of the state and people reemerged. The people got disappointed with the government of the time which was famous as the 'construction government'.

Iranian populace showed their disagreement with unfair development by their huge participation in 2<sup>nd</sup> of Khordad 1997 election. They voted for Mr. *Khatami* as the new president of the country. Mr. Khatami was supposed to put an end to all inequalities enrolled under the two last governments headed by Mr. *Rafsanjani*. Mr. Khatami's era started with the program of political development and put all his efforts and reputation on this target. Of course political fairness was one of the aims of Iranians but more than that economic justice was wanted. During Mr. Khatami's time liberal political interpretations enhanced liberal economy. They voted for Mr. Khatami for his second run aiming to give him more time for betterment of the situation. But nothing has changed in regard of justice. The situation not even got better but worse, according to Iranian people; a large number of Iranian populace are living under the poverty line.

In 2005, more than 63 % of eligible Iranians voted for justice in the new presidential election. Dr. *Ahmadinezhad* the new elected president is supposed to lead the country toward justice. This is the dominant interpretation of those who have voted for him.

**Notes:**

- i More than ninety percent of Iranian population are Shiite Moslem.
- ii Abdol Azim is a town near Tehran where the shrine of Hazrat-e Abdol Azim is located and which was a common place for pursuing asylum.
- iii According to Algar: 'The Pahlavi assault on the position of the ulama in Iranian society began with a conscription law in May 1925 that arrogated to the state the right to examine religious students with a view to their exemption from military service. Then came the promulgation of a Civil Code, under the aspics of Ali Akbar Davar, Minister of Justice, rectified in May 1928. The attack on the legal and juridical functions of the ulama that this implied continued, in November 1931, with the restriction of the competence of sharia tribunals to matters of marriage, divorce, and the appointment of trustees and guardians; and in March 1932, with the termination of all notarial functions exercised by the ulama. The latter measure reduced to penury many lesser religious scholars who did not have access to the resources of the *auqaf* (endowments). Similarly, in 1936, legislation was passed that effectively excluded ulama from holding the position of judge (Algar 1991: 741. Original italic.).
- iv All of them were opposed by Ay Khomeini in form of issuing proclamations and messages (Algar 1991, 754-755).
- v Cyrus the Great was the King of Persia from 550 to 529 BC.

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## 1. ザーヘッド先生の紹介

サイド ザーヘッド (Sayed Saaid Zahed Zahedani) 先生は、大東文化大学の提携校であるイラン国シーラーズ大学社会科学部社会学・社会計画学科の学科長である。2005年度の現代アジア研究所の招聘研究員として来日(6月23日から7月7日)し、その間、本学を拠点にして研究者交流会、大学院特別セミナー、学部生対象の講演会などを精力的にこなされた。ちょうど梅雨の季節であり、乾燥地イランから来られた先生にとっては雨、雨、また雨の毎日で、日本の高い湿気には、さぞ閉口されていたのではないだろうか。

先生は予言者ムハンマドの直系子孫および一部の傍系親族に与えられる一般的尊称であるサイドの名前をもつ宗教的家系の生まれであり、自身もイスラーム信仰に篤い宗教的誠実さをもった学者のひとりである。宿泊先の川越では、余暇を見つけては多くの神社仏閣などの宗教施設を興味深そうに見学されていた。

ザーヘッド教授は、イラン国シーラーズ大学で社会学学士 (Alienation among Iranian Students, 1974)、テヘラン大学で社会学修士 (Slum Areas in Iran, 1977)、英国のリーズ大学で社会学博士 (Exploring the Pattern of Islamic Social Movement : Four Case Studies 1997) を取得され、一貫して社会学専攻の道を歩んでこられた。とりわけ、組織社会学、社会運動論、歴史社会学などを専門分野とし、その研究業績が多い。

昨今、注目を集めているイスラーム世界の社会政治運動の動向を、民衆に内在する多様な社会的価値観との関連の中で、とりわけ、宗教指導者層が民衆を動員しながら社会政治改革運動を行っている動きを分析している。最近は社会学における時間の問題に関心を寄

せられ、地域性と地域の歴史社会学に関心を傾けている。

主要業績としては、以下のような著作、論文などがある。

- (1) Exploring the Pattern of Islamic Social Movement : Four Case Studies (University of Leeds, PhD Thesis, 1997)
- (2) Iranian Identity and Globalization (Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, Warwick University, 2004 , pp.1-18)
- (3) A Short Analysis of the Women's Role in Iranian History (Farhang, Vol. 16.No.48, 2004, pp.51~138)

## 2. 本論文について

本論文、Socio - Political Changes in Iran - Qajar to Now - は、2005年6月30日に本学で行った特別講演会をもとに執筆依頼したものである。カージャール朝期(1796~1925)からパフラヴィー朝期(1925~1979)を経て、今日のイラン・イスラーム共和国期(1979~)まで、およそ2世紀以上にわたるイラン近代史の中で、イスラーム宗教勢力が果たした政治社会改革運動の軌跡を概観している。

英露をはじめとする列強、後に米国に政治的、経済的な従属を余儀なくされた時代のなかで、イスラーム宗教勢力は、その宗教イデオロギーによって一般信徒の心をつかみ、宗教的禁止令によって大衆動員をかけ、力づくで西欧近代化路線を推し進めようとする独裁的世俗権力に抵抗し、内側からの政治社会改革運動を行ったきた。著者は、その運動の軌跡が、今日のイスラーム共和国の樹立につながっていることを分析している。

ウラマーと呼ばれているイスラーム諸学を修めた宗教知識人層は、イスラーム的正当性

を保証する社会的役割を担っており、為政者と民衆の間であって、時にはその統治を非イスラーム的であると糾弾し、また、ある時は、その統治にイスラーム的であるとしてお墨付きを与える立場にある。イラン近現代史において、ウラマー層が民衆を指導、動員して社会政治改革運動を行ったその萌芽は、タバコボイコット運動や立憲革命などに見られるようにカージャー朝期にある。第2次大戦後になると石油国有化運動、反白色革命、それに今日のイラン革命からイスラーム共和国樹立に続く一連の社会政治改革運動の流れの中に見られた。

本論文は、イスラーム宗教勢力側からの社会政治改革運動に力点が置かれているが、イラン近現代の中では、欧米列強の従属から立ち上がるために多様な社会政治集団によるイデオロギーと運動が存在してきた。例えば、(1)西欧資本主義的近代化派、(2)社会主義的近代化派、(3)民族主義的近代化派、(4)イスラーム主義的近代化派などを挙げることができる。このなかで、1979年のイラン革命では、イスラーム宗教勢力が台頭し、イスラーム法学者の統治を基本におくイスラーム共和国が樹立するに至った。

しかし、イスラーム宗教勢力といわれている集団も決して一枚岩でない。民族主義的近代化派と歩調を合わせながら、後には内部分裂し反動的な方向に動いてしまったこともある（立憲革命時のヌーリー師、石油国有化運動時のカーシャーニー師、農地改革時のホメイニー師など）。歴史のある段階で社会政治的に進歩的にもなり、反動的にもなりうる矛盾をもった存在としてみる立場も必要ではないか。また、改革運動の背後にある石油という魔物、経済的利害という要素との関係をもう少し知りたいと思った。

最後に、本論文を読みかえすのに『岩波イスラーム辞典』が参考になったことを記しておきたい。

(原 隆一)