

Philosophical Analysis on Contingency

Zaw Moe Lwin

偶然性の哲学的分析

本研究では、偶然性を哲学の問題として取り上げることにする。なぜなら偶然そのものは、哲学以外の学問には対象として取り扱えないという根源的性格を持っているからである。偶然性とは必然性の否定であり、たまたま有るという意味である。それは、無いことがありうる存在を意味する。それゆえ偶然性を問題とするということは、存在を超えて無いことを問うことを意味する。偶然性とは有と無との接触面、有が無に根ざしている状態、無が有を侵しているときに成立する存在であり、この、無に向かって存在を問うということによって、偶然性の問題は厳密に形而上学の問題と言われるべきなのである。ここで、偶然性が必然性に対立した意味を持つことから、必然性の三様態の分類に応じて、偶然性もまた三つの様態に区別する。(一) 定言的偶然、(二) 仮説的偶然、(三) 離接的偶然の三つである。それぞれの分析を「論理的」(logical) な観点、「経験的」(empirical) な観点、「形而上学的」(metaphysical) な観点に対応すると考えられる。

定言的偶然とは論理学上の概念的見地に基づいて考えられる偶然である。基本的に定言的偶然とは概念に対しての偶然的徴表をいうのである。仮説的偶然は定言的偶然の存在に対する疑問から出発する。定言的偶然の存在に対する疑問は、個々の事実および個物の存在に対する疑問を意味する。個物の存在に対する疑問とは、なぜに一般概念の類や種のほかに個物が存在するかを問うことである。個物の存在については、一般概念の論理を考えるだけでは不十分である。ここでは、存在理由を考えなければならないのである。従って、我々の問題は概念性から理由性の問題へ移るのである。離接的偶然は全体と部分との関係に関して理解できる。まず全体とは、絶対的な同一性を持つものであり、必然的である。それに反して、部分は部分の性格として絶対的な自己同一性を欠いている。部分の存在は他の部分を予想し、自らの中に、この部分でもあの部分でもあり得るという性格を持っている。そうして、各々の部分は相互に離接的關係を持って存在するものである。

Introduction

Why should we discuss the problem of contingency? Two evident reasons can be provided for this question. The first apparent reason concerns metaphysics. The problem of contingency that involves questions of nothingness is a crucial problem of metaphysics. Through contingency, we

realize that being is founded upon nothingness. This is because in a contingent condition, being is rooted in nothingness, and nothingness invades being. Contingency is the most important meeting point of being (有) and nothingness (無). Accordingly, the study of contingency differs from the study of general laws and general ideas. It is strictly a metaphysical problem.

The second noticeable reason should not be confused with the theory of probability. The aim or task of the theory of probability is only to calculate the number of contingent possibilities; it does not intend to explain contingency itself. Although probability theory is a useful method to conjecture contingent possibilities, it is not entirely related to the problem of contingency. Moreover, the problem of contingency cannot be explained by probability theory. The problem of contingency only concerns the encounter of two independent phenomena at a particular place and instance. It also pertains to the problem of our existence. We cannot realize contingency by the computation process.

In our discussion, we understand the notion of contingency as the opposition of necessity. This leads us to classify contingency into three types. We have already understood the three types of necessities: (1) the necessity between a universal concept and an individual thing, (2) the necessity between antecedent and consequence and (3) the necessity between totality and particularity. In addition to these three types of necessities, Kuki divides contingency into the following three types: (1) categorical contingency, (2) hypothetical contingency and (3) disjunctive contingency.

1. Categorical Contingency

Categorical contingency can be observed through the non-essential character of a universal concept. It can also be explained by synthetic judgement, particular judgement and through isolated and exceptional facts.

It has always been said that there is a necessary relationship between a universal concept and its essential character. The essential character of a concept is also known as its necessary character. For example, the three lines and three angles of a triangle are its essential character. A drawing cannot be called a triangle if it does not have three lines and three angles. The concept of a triangle and its essential character are necessarily related. Nevertheless, we can observe contingency between a universal concept and its non-essential character. When we consider the contingent character, it is possible for a triangle to be an acute or obtuse triangle. The presence of an acute or obtuse angle in a triangle constitutes the non-essential character of the triangle. In this sense, we can consider categorical contingency to be an accidental character or non-essential character of a general concept.

By definition, the subject and predicate terms of an analytic judgement are equal. The predicate term of an analytic judgement does not provide any new information about the subject term. It can only express the essential character of the subject term. However, in a synthetic judgement, the

predicate differs from the subject and provides some new information about the subject. In other words, the predicate term of a synthetic judgement expresses the non-essential character of the judgement. Thus, synthetic judgements are contingent in character, whereas analytic judgements are necessary.

Particular judgements can also express categorical contingency. When we make a particular judgement such as the one in the sentence 'Some men are black or some men are not white' , we do not refer to the general idea of human beings. Skin colour is not an essential character of man; it is merely an accidental character. Man is born regardless of whether white, black or yellow skin.

An isolated or individual fact should also be considered as categorical contingency. As Cohen says, *'If a fact in reality is not come to fit with general relevance, it must be accepted as an unaccustomed contingent fact.* For example, with its respective concept of the body, organic is an isolated fact for mathematical science. Aristotle also stated that the universal object belongs to itself, but the contingent object does not belong to itself; it is only an individual object.

Since categorical contingency can be regarded as a non-essential character, particular judgement or an isolated fact, it can also be known as an exceptional case. A contingent phenomenon does not belong to the function of subsumption of a conceptual identity. The function of subsumption accompanies the scheme of 'always' or 'almost always' . On the contrary, categorical contingency accompanies schemes like 'in some cases' or 'in rare cases' . In the case of rareness, contingency takes the meaning of exception to the level of a universal law. It is this fact that enables us to realize that the word 'contingency' has rareness in its origin. The Japanese use an interesting term '*Wakuraba*'—a dead leaf like a red maple that is seen in summer—as a classical expression for contingency. In the summer of Japan, all trees produce new green leaves. A dead leaf is a rare sight in summer.

2. Hypothetical Contingency

Here, we consider the reason why categorical contingency exists. The main theme of this section is to discuss the reason for the cause of the existence of categorical contingency.

A cold day in midsummer is generally considered to be an exceptional case. Nevertheless, this does not imply a lack of reason or cause to explain the low temperature on that day. This could be explained by some causal factor such as sunspots. Similarly, a four-leaf clover or a double-headed snake will be considered as a rare case. How do we determine whether a four-leaf clover and a double-headed snake are uncommon and isolated facts? We differentiate a four-leaf clover from the universal concept of clovers and a double-headed snake from normal snakes. In other words, when we discuss a four-leaf clover, we refer to one of the clovers; similarly, in the case of the double-headed snake, we refer to one of the snakes. Given this understanding we have to consider the facts that a leaf is governed by its botanical laws and an animal is governed by its biological

laws. The existence of an isolated fact is inexplicable.

2.1. Logical contingency

A closer examination reveals that there are three types of reasons: (1) reason in the narrow sense, namely, reason concerning our thoughts or judgements, (2) cause and (3) purpose.

Kuki further divides each type of reason into two, positive and negative. If we consider the non-existence of reason, cause or purpose, we term it as the negative type; if we consider the existence of something other than rational necessity, causal necessity or purpose, we term it as a positive type.

2.1.1. Negative irrational contingency

This type of contingency refers to the lack of reason or knowledge for making our judgements. As stated by Descartes, judgements should be made only when we possess clear and distinct knowledge. If we affirm or negate something without possessing clear and distinct knowledge, our judgements would be contingent. Generally, irrational contingency occurs in circumstances surrounding dreams, insanity and artistic inspiration or works of art.

In our dreams, the sequences of images may be totally irrational. We inadvertently face capricious images in our dreams. For example, in one's dream, one may be riding a horse that has a horn and eats roses; there is a sudden confrontation with the enemies, causing your horse to bark loudly and fly high, as a result of which one falls endlessly from the top of a mountain and into a valley. After waking up, the person will realize that all the images in his/her dream are both irrational and accidental.

The mental state of disordered persons is irrational and accidental in character. According to a doctor, a female patient residing in his hospital believed the following: in the morning, she is proposed by a noble man and receives flowers and sweets; she then marries him in a wedding ceremony held at noon. Further, she gives birth to a baby boy in the evening, and her relatives and friends come to visit her son. In the middle of the same night, she loses her son and begins crying. This routine continues for many days. It is obvious that the behaviours and ideas of this woman are very complicated and lack rationality. Furthermore, certain words spoken by old King Lear can also be taken as an example of irrational contingency. In Scene Six of Act Three, the old Lear said: *'Then let them anatomize Regan; see what breeds about her heart. Is there any cause in nature that makes these hard hearts? You, sir, I entertain for one of my hundred; only I do not like the fashion of your garments. You will say they are Persian, but let them be chang' d. Make no noise, make no noise; draw the curtains. So, so. We' ll go to supper i' th' morning'*. All of these confusing words are uttered by King Lear for no apparent reason.

Although artistic works are considered to be different from dreams and insanity, the lack of reason found in art is more extreme than the latter two. This type of contingency is observed in the words or phrases of songs and poems. In 'A Midsummer Night's Dream', Shakespeare wrote: *'The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man's hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report, what my dream was'* (Act Four; Scene One). It is clear that there is no logical relationship between one word and another. By the coherence between words, irrationality in words or lack of reason comes into existence. Nevertheless, the artistic value remains unchanged.

2.1.2. Positive irrational contingency

In the case of irrational positive contingency, in addition to rational necessity we observe a positive relationship. In other words, a meaningful relationship between two or more things without any logical relationship is regarded as an irrational positive contingency.

To explain this type of contingency, Kuki provides Archimedes' pi ($\pi = 22/7$) as an example. If we determine the decimal value of pi, we will obtain a recurring decimal number as 3.142857142857 Pi is a number that is equal to the distance around a circle, divided by its width. It need not contain recurring decimal numbers. Nevertheless, Archimedes' pi contains the recurring decimal numbers '142857'. In this case, the relationship between one instance of 142857 and another instance of 142857 is neither rational nor logical. Thus, we can term the recurrence of 142857 in Archimedes' pi as an irrational positive contingency.

Another example of this type of contingency can be seen in Japanese fortune-telling in which one's fortunes are revealed by the sound of that person's name and by counting the number of Kanji character's strokes. Different people are given different names for some reasons. One's name may have its own meaning. However, according to Japanese name fortune-telling, all names are grouped based on their sounds and the number of Kanji character strokes. In this manner, different people with different names are included in the same fortune. Let us assume that the number of strokes in A's name is 18, which the same as that in B's name. It can be said that there is no logical relation between the names of A and B. Obtaining the same number of Kanji strokes in their names can be regarded as a positive irrational contingency.

2.2. Teleological contingency

As mentioned above, the purpose or teleological factor has its own account in the relationship of two events. Causal relations alone are not sufficient to explain the occurrence of an event. As the opposition of teleological necessity, Kuki classifies teleological contingency and divides it into two, positive and negative.

2.2.1. Negative teleological contingency

Negative teleological contingency can be understood in two ways: (1) purposelessness or absence of purpose and (2) denial of purpose.

Generally, people consider purposelessness along with causal necessity. However, in Kuki's classification, the absence of purpose is a type of contingency. Mechanistic determinism claims that the entire universe is regulated by teleological contingency. Thus, in his 'Human mechanism', Julien de La Mettrie wrote: 'Probably, human beings have been accidentally thrown out into the somewhere of the world'. In the same book, he also wrote, 'There is no justification to say that our eye is purposeful to see the objects, and it is especially created or put into its present place by someone or something'. The eye can see because it possesses the present organism in its present position, i.e. its lens, its nerve system related to the brain, etc. Similarly, by the law of nature, the eye must possess the same organism and must position itself in the same place. Otherwise, we cannot explain and justify its purpose to see objects.

Man is regarded as a rational being whose purpose is to behave rationally. Unfortunately, an idiot cannot fulfil the purpose of man with rationality. Kuki describes that the existence of an idiot can be considered as a negative teleological contingency. The existence of a many-petaled flower also cannot fulfil the reproductive function of the plant and can be regarded as a negative teleological contingency. The existence of a four-leaf clover and that of a double-headed snake are regarded as contingencies because both cannot fulfil the purpose of a clover and a snake. Aristotle considered this type of contingency as anti-natural phenomena and Hegel referred to it as the impotence of nature.

2.2.2. Positive teleological contingency

Positive teleological contingency refers to the establishment of contingency that is beyond aim or purpose. For example, one digs a hole in the ground to plant a tree and if he finds the treasure in that hole, it will be known as a contingency. It is evident that finding the treasure is not included in the *original* purpose of that man, to dig in the exact place where one may have previously hid or kept the treasure. Further, the discovery of phosphorus also constitutes the same type of contingency. Brando heated urine strongly in his attempt to create gold in his days. He did not obtain the gold by this method, but instead he discovered phosphorus. The discovery of phosphorus is not contained in the first purpose of Brando.

Let us take an example of an intersection of A and B at C. Under the topic of categorical contingency, the meeting of A and B at C is considered as one of the categorical contingencies. Further, under the topic of *hypothetical contingency*, we discuss the possibility of a causal series of A and B, i.e. we suppose that A has its own causal series as A1, A2 and A3 to meet B at C.

Similarly, B could have its own causal series as B1, B2 and B3 to meet A at C. Therefore, it can be considered philosophically that these two causal series A A1 A2 A3 and B B1 B2 B3 were once intersected at D and that intersection D can be considered as the accidental meeting of other causal series. In this way, these intersections can be philosophically considered until the point 'x' is reached, which pertains to infinite contingency or primitive contingency.

2.3. Causal contingency

Since we understand contingency as the opposition of necessity, we need to classify causal contingency as opposed to causal necessity. In general considerations, purpose is almost absent. However, in a systematic analysis, purpose assumes a significant role among causal factors. This is why Aristotle distinguished the *efficient cause* from the final *cause*. Of the three types of logical contingency, while causal contingency and teleological contingency deal with existential reason, irrational contingency deals with cognitive reason.

2.3.1. Negative causal contingency

Negative causal contingency implies the witnessing of the absence of causal necessity. Lucretius' clinamen is a classical example of this type. Epicurus stated that the downward movement of atoms, without any cause, spontaneously deviate from the vertical line. Lucretius termed this deviation of atoms as clinamen.

In one sense, the absence of causality implies acting voluntarily or without guidance, such that negative causal contingency is often regarded as liberty. For example, Karl Marx wrote: 'Man traditionally called, in a given particular situation, the right to possess and enjoy contingency without any interference as personal freedom' .

The Japanese use the word 'Onozukara' to describe the idea of indeterministic spontaneity. Kuki explains that the meaning of freedom (*Mizukara or Jiyuu*) and nature (*Shizenn*) are contained in the word 'Onozukara' . From the eastern way of thinking, Kuki did not perceive freedom and nature as two different separate things. He explained that these two differ only in the way in which they are combined with necessity and contingency.

Freedom (*Jiyuu or Mizukara*) can be explained in terms of the combination of causal contingency and teleological necessity. This is known as a heterogeneous combination because of the manner in which different types of contingency and necessity are combined. Similarly, by nature, Shizenn or Jenenn or Onozukara can also be explained in terms of the combination of causal contingency and teleological contingency. This is known as a homogeneous combination because it is only a combination of the two types of contingency.

2.3.2. Positive causal contingency

Positive causal contingency implies the witnessing of the occurrence of two or more events in which their relation is beyond causality. For example, if a tile drops from the roof, hits the balloon that has rolled under the eaves and causes it to burst, we will consider it to be an accident. Again, the simultaneous occurrence of a volcanic explosion and a solar eclipse is regarded as accidental. The tile could have fallen down because the roof might have become corroded, because the wind might have blown it off the roof or due to other reasons. In accordance with the law of gravitation, a loose tile will fall down. The balloon rolled and reached under the eaves because it had been slightly impacted initially, because of its elasticity and spherical shape and because the ground it rolled on was uneven. By the law of motion, the balloon will roll until it reaches a certain place. The encounter of two events possessing different causal series is known as contingency. Similarly, a volcano explodes when its underground hot waters evaporate and reach a certain degree of tension. In accordance with the law of pressure, it will explode. The astronomical law of a solar eclipse is very simple. During a solar eclipse, the moon moves between the Sun and the Earth, resulting in the dark shape of the moon on the sun. When two events occur simultaneously, the causal series of one event is completely independent from that of the other. There is no causal relationship between these two series. The necessary relationship cannot be considered between these two series. This mutual relationship of two different causal series without necessity is also known as contingency.

The following is a suitable example for the establishing contingency among many events. 'Let' s consider a white ball. Like a machine runs according to its own system, a white ball thrown on to a smooth board runs by its own laws. If we throw many balls onto that board, we do see various unexpected spot-like patterns of the balls. In the case of each ball, the type of pattern that will be seen is entirely accidental' . (Ishi Wara Jun, 'God loves contingency,' Magazine (*Serupan*), 1935. June issue, page7). Although contingency may be established among more than two events, the basic model is the establishment between two events of different causal series. This model of contingency is extremely important.

3. Disjunctive Contingency

With the end of our discussion on hypothetical contingency, we arrived at the analysis of primitive contingency. Unfortunately, we cannot empirically analyse primitive contingency for further discussion. In other words, our problem now enters the realm of metaphysics. For this reason, Kuki analyses this problem from the perspective of modality. Throughout his modal analysis, Kuki' s real intention is to discuss how to accept the value or meaning of contingency for our existence.

3.1. The meaning of disjunctive contingency

Disjunctive contingency can be explained from the relationship of totality and particularity. As we already know, totality has its own completeness and self-identity; it also exists by necessity. In contrast, a particular phenomenon cannot complete by itself; it lacks self-identity. A particular thing cannot exist by itself; it exists in anticipation of other phenomena. By its own nature, a thing can possibly be *this* or *that* particular phenomenon. Hence, each particular phenomenon can be viewed as a contingent disjunct of totality. For example, it is possible to consider water in the total state of fluid, solid and vapour. It is impossible to consider water beyond these three states. Each state of water—fluid, solid or vapour—is a disjunct by means of the scheme ($W = F \vee S \vee P$). In a particular situation, water remains in a certain state; in another situation, it assumes a different state. The fluid state of water involves the possibility of existing in the solid state and also as vapour. Thus, we can say that a certain state of water is contingent in character.

For further appreciation of the nature of disjunctive contingency, the following two tanka poems are taken from Manyoushuu.

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| (1) | Kokoro ni wa Wasurenu mono o Tamatama mo Mizaruhi maneku Tsuki zo henikeru | Though in my heart I have never forgotten, Very rare to me Many days without meeting A whole month has gone by. |
|-----|--|---|
- (From Manyoushuu volume-IV)*

In this poem, the poet yearns to meet her partner someday. It is possible for her to meet him on any of the 365 days of a year; however, she is able to meet him very rarely. A year comprising 365 days is the totality of their meeting possibilities. On the other hand, a particular day on which they have a rare meeting is a disjunctive contingency.

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| (2) | Kono yo ni shi Tanoshiku araba Komu yo ni wa Mushi ni tori ni mo Ware wa narinamu | In this life at least Let me just enjoy myself, And in lives to come I'll be perfectly content To be a bug, a bird. |
|-----|---|---|
- (From Manyoushuu volume-III);*
Translated by Edwin A. Cranston in 'A Waka Anthology'

According to the above poem, the poet considers the possibility of alternative future lives.

Nevertheless, he values and demands the enjoyment of his present life. From this poem, we can understand that to be born in a certain life is a disjunctive contingency because it is possible for us to be born in other lives.

3.2. The different systems of modalities

Generally, our system of modalities simply corresponds with the following schemes:

(1) Since contingency is contradictory to the existence of necessity and necessity is contradictory to the existence of contingency, necessity and contingency form an opposite-contradictory (矛盾对当) relationship.

(2) Since impossibility is contradictory to the existence of possibility and possibility is contradictory to the existence of impossibility, possibility and impossibility form an opposite-contradictory (矛盾对当) relationship.

(3) Since impossibility asserts the non-existence of necessity and necessity asserts the non-existence of impossibility, a resemblance between necessity and impossibility is observed.

(4) Since contingency affirms the non-existence of possibility and possibility affirms the non-existence of contingency, there is a resemblance observed between contingency and possibility.

In the second step, our system develops in combination with the pair of modalities that possess resembling characters.

(1) Necessity and impossibility contradict each other, but there is no excluded middle between them. Necessity and impossibility cannot be simultaneously true, but they can be simultaneously false. Thus, necessity and impossibility form an opposite-contrary relationship (反对对当).

(2) Contingency and possibility do not contradict each other, but there is excluded middle between them. Contingency and possibility cannot be simultaneously false, but they can be simultaneously true. Thus, contingency and possibility form a sub-opposite contrary relationship (小反对对当).

Although we have discussed the resemblance of contingency and possibility in general considerations, the most important resemblance is the intimate relationship between contingency and impossibility. To clarify the close proximity of contingency and impossibility, we must begin with necessity and impossibility. The idea of possibility comes to exist with the denial of impossibility. This possibility then develops gradually. When possibility develops completely, we realize it as a necessity. On the other hand, the idea of contingency comes to exist with the denial of necessity and contingency develops gradually. Finally, the utmost development of contingency is satisfied as impossibility. Here, contingency and possibility oppose each other, whereas contingency and impossibility are in close proximity. In this manner, the more the possibility increases, the less the contingency decreases, and vice versa. In addition, we can assert that

contingency increases with increase in impossibility.

In the final stage, we have to develop our analysis by considering the scope of reality and non-reality and the characteristics of demonstration (確証性), problematization (問題性) and assertion (言明性) and by considering the dimensions of being and nothingness.

(1) Under the range of reality, the pair of necessity and contingency forms an opposite-contradictory (矛盾对当) relationship. Under the scope of non-reality, the pair of possibility and impossibility also forms an opposite-contradictory (矛盾对当) relationship.

(2) Although the pair of necessity and impossibility forms an opposite-contrary (反对对当), in accordance with the characteristic of demonstration, their characters resemble each other. Similarly, although the pair of contingency and possibility forms a sub-opposite contrary (小反对对当) relationship, their characters of resemblance are found in the characteristic of problematization.

(3) From the dimension of being, the pair of necessity and possibility forms a subaltern relation (大小对当), and they are in close proximity. Similarly, from the dimension of nothingness, the pair of contingency and impossibility also forms a subaltern relation (大小对当), and they are in close proximity.

3.3. Contingency and emotion of wonder

Sometimes, through the emotion of wonder, contingency can be transformed into its opposite. When a contingent encounter has sufficient power to change the direction of our life or impacts our existence, it appears necessary. From this perspective, we begin to perceive contingency as destiny.

In this section, Kuki explains the phenomenological description of three modals—contingency, necessity and possibility—along with their temporal characters. The first is the concept of possibility that is based on the temporal character of the future and possesses the emotion of anxiety as its value. Next, the necessity is based on the temporal character of the past and possesses the emotion of peace and quiet. At this point, it is not difficult to understand what Kuki intends to say. For example, if our future possibility or future plans came to exist inevitably, our anxiety and tension would disappear, and we would easily experience peace and quiet. When we are anxious about the possibility of the future, we hold on to our hope with pleasure on the one hand and worry in pain on the other. If the hopeful possibility comes to exist inevitably, we will be at ease with satisfaction; if the worrisome possibility comes to exist inevitably, our worries will transform into melancholy. On the contrary, if the expected possibility does not come to exist, our hope will transform into depression, and the worry, into relief.

Contingency is related with the temporal character of the present and possesses the emotional value of wonder and excitement. Necessity possesses the static quality of the emotion of peace and

quiet, whereas contingency and possibility possess the dynamic quality of wonder and excitement. The reason for this is that necessity is precisely analysable and soluble, but contingency is an insoluble state of affair. At this point, it should be noted that the different levels of standpoints result in different levels of wonderful emotions. For example, a wonderful contingency for human beings may be humour for godlike beings.

3.4. Contingency and destiny

As observed earlier, a contingent encounter that has sufficient power to change the direction of our lives or to impact our existence appears necessary and leads us to perceive contingency as our destiny.

According to Kuki, destiny is a necessary contingent in character. Kuki explanation for this is that the idea of destiny probably originates from teleological contingency. Further, we must keep in mind that it is easy to combine a teleological contingency with causal necessity and causal necessity with teleological necessity. Therefore, destiny can be formed as a complex combination of contingency and necessity. There are two types of combinations in which the idea of destiny can be formed. The first type is the combination of teleological contingency and causal necessity and the second, a combination of teleological contingency and teleological necessity. The first type of destiny appears to us as blind Fate without any consolation. For example, the idea of destiny in ancient Stoic philosophy is first type of destiny in which man's destiny is determined by mechanistic destiny, and it cannot be escaped. The second type appears to us as Providence with consolation. This type of destiny can be found in Christianity in the form of divine providence. In Kuki's explanation, the first one can be understood under the limitation of human existence and in relation to human objectives, whereas the latter can be understood in relation to transcendental beings and transcendental objectives. Kuki considers the first type of destiny as the ordinary understanding of destiny and the latter one as the real meaning of destiny. With regard to ordinary understanding, people believe that teleological contingency is restricted by teleological necessity. However, with regard to the real meaning of destiny, a teleological necessity is restricted by a teleological contingency.

3.5. Internalization of contingency

The idea of internalization of contingency appears as the conclusion of Kuki's work '*Guzensei no mondai*'. At the end of his work, Kuki reformulates the problem of contingency from theoretical description to practical prescription for life.

In our daily existence, the contingent encounter is not merely a theoretical concept but an undeniable

reality. In the practical course of life, whether or not we realize it, we have to encounter an infinite variety of contingent phenomena. For example, we have to encounter different people, different cultures, different climates, different destinies and so on. According to Kuki, the real nature of our existence is not in identical isolation, but in an I-Thou relationship replete with encounters. Furthermore, the real essence of an I-Thou relationship involves capturing another's contingency and assimilating and internalizing this encounter as one's own. However, we have to bear in mind that our encounters are a necessary contingent in character.

According to Kuki, no encounter in the world is fruitless. Every contingent encounter possesses latent possibility and has considerable value for our existence. This is because a contingent encounter approaches us with the rarest possibility from the depth of impossibility. Thus, in accordance with the internalization process, this contingency bears a new possibility. When this possibility develops completely, it transforms into necessity, and if it possesses sufficient power to change the direction of our lives, we consider it as our destiny. The most important problem is how to resolve an encounter with contingency and how to enjoy our practical life with contingency. Finally, Kuki leaves us with a practical imperative: 'Don't let your encounter be fruitless'.

Reference

- 九鬼周造 1979 (1930) 『「いき」の構造』岩波書店
 九鬼周造 2000 (1935) 『偶然性の問題・文芸論』燈影舎
 九鬼周造 1991 (1937) 『偶然と運命』九鬼周造随筆集』岩波書店
- Pincus, Leslie, 1996 “*Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan: Kuki Shuzo and the rise of national aesthetics,*” University of California Press
 - 本田元 2001 『偶然性と運命』岩波新書
 - 佐藤昌三 2004 『和のこころ日本伝統芸術へのいざない』Keio University Press
 - 井本農一 今泉準一 1982 『連句読本』大修館書店
 - 井上喜久男 竹内順一 1999 『やきもの名鑑〈1〉窯変と焼締陶』講談社
 - 坂部恵 (他) 2002 『九鬼周造の世界』ミネルヴァ書房
 “Towards a Topology of the Encounter” , *in Acte du Colloque franco-japonais sur la recherche paysagère*; 5-9 octobre 1987
 Tokyo-Kyoto. 『日仏景観論シンポジウム報告集 1987年10月5-9日東京-京都』