

## Japan's Modernization and China

(Based on a lecture at the Academic Forum Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Academic Exchange Agreement between Beijing Foreign Studies University and Daito Bunka University held on May 1, 2000)

*Mamoru Wada\**

Professor, Faculty of Law, Daito Bunka University

### I .

The Headquarters and Itabashi Campus of Daito Bunka University is located in Takashima-daira, Itabashi Ward, Tokyo. The name of Takashima-daira came from Takashima Shûhan (1798-1866), an expert of Western gunnery at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate. This is truly symbolic when we think about relations between China and Japan's modernization, and it is what we, faculty staff and students at Daito Bunka University, are very proud of. I would like to start this essay with an anecdote of Takashima Shûhan and go on to discuss some important issues as to relations between China and Japan's modernization.

Takashima Shûhan was *machidoshiyori*, a senior town official, of Nagasaki. In those days of national isolation, Nagasaki was the only port town that was open to Western countries and China. Takashima was knowledgeable of Western gunnery. During the Opium War (1839-42), he learned at the early stage of the war that China was being defeated by Britain with her overwhelming military strength. Having learned that, he submitted a "Recommendation of Introduction of Western Gunnery" to the Shogunate as early as in September 1840 (Tenpô 11). In this recommendation, Takashima said that even though "the cause of war" maintained by a barbarian country of Britain was "unjustifiable", it was undeniable that the Qing Dynasty was suffering a dreadful defeat by "sophisticated weaponry". Therefore, he continues to emphasize, a neighboring Japan must learn from China's experiences and introduce "the art of barbarians", i.e., the Western gunnery, to strengthen her military might.<sup>(1)</sup>

Fortunately, his recommendation was adopted by the Shogunate, and a Western artillery demonstration was conducted in Tokumaru-ga-hara in Itabashi on May 9 of the following year (1841). The demonstration was successful, and the Takashima-ryu (style) Western artillery was spread to other parts of Japan. Particularly, Egawa Tarôzaemon (1801-1855), daikan, or chief magistrate, of Izu (now part of Shizuoka Prefecture), was initiated into its "mastery" and built a reverberatory furnace in Nirayama. In this way, he made great efforts to modernize Japan's military and science technology. Then, Sakuma Shôzan (1811-1864) of Matsushiro Domain (now Nagano

Prefecture), who learned the gunnery from Egawa, opened a private school of Western military science and gunnery in Edo and promoted Western learning. He set forth “Eastern ethics and Western technique”, emphasizing a necessity to transform the conventional abstraction of Confucianism. He stressed the importance of empirical and experimental studies and recommended his domain lord, Sanada Yukitsura (1791-1852) to develop industry and promote gunnery. Sakuma, then, came to advocate a theory of union of court and shogunate as a framework of national government to take over the Tokugawa Shogunate, which was going to its doom at the time.

One of admirers of Sakuma Shôzan was Yoshida Shôin (1830-1859) of Chôshû Domain (now Yamaguchi Prefecture), who developed the theory of union of court and shogunate into a theory of *sonnô jôi* (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians) and advocated to overthrow the shogunate and establish a government of unified nation.

Such a brief glance at history is enough to make us realize the historical significance of the Western artillery demonstration in Tokumaru-ga-hara. Taking a wider perspective, we can understand that countermeasures to the so-called “Western shock” had already been taken. By the “Western shock”, one would typically indicate an event that Commodore Mathew Perry's ships entered Edo Bay (now Tokyo Bay) in 1853. In the year, a fleet of four warships sailed to Urawa in the vicinity of Edo to press the shogunate to open up the country. No wonder, the shogunate was stunned, and public discussions flared up. By *Nichibei Washin Jôyaku* (Kanagawa Treaty) concluded in the following year (1854) and *Nichibei Shûko Tsûshô Jôyaku* (Harris Treaty) in 1858, Japan opened up the country and got woven into international social order established by powerful Western countries. Afterward, Japan tried to modernize the country with the Meiji Restoration at the core of efforts to build a unified nation with centralized power.

From the perspective of Japan vs. other part of the world, the abovementioned description might be about right. However, from the perspective of Asia vs. the West or other part of the world, it might be a little different. It was not only the Japanese that were stunned by the “Western shock”, but also were the Chinese and other Asian peoples. Not to mention the colonization of India, other Asian countries took China's defeat in the Opium War very seriously. An attitude of facing the grave reality encouraged people to depart from the traditional view of international order with moral justification such as “distinction between China and the rest of the world”. The earlier mentioned Takashima Shûhan was confined in his house for ten years due to the involvement in the “Nagasaki Incident” after the Tokumaru-ga-hara demonstration. After released, he found shelter with Egawa Tarôzaemon. In the midst of flared-up public discussions triggered by Perry's visit to Japan, he wrote a “Recommendation for Foreign Trade” (1853), in which he said, “When it comes to art (technology), Japan has adopted the best of a breed regardless of the origin, whether it was China or other countries.<sup>(2)</sup>” Initially, he was mainly interested in employment of the Western military technology, but later, he came to advocate adoption of the

Western generic science and technology for good purposes.

In this way, we need to review the course of the modernization of Japan as part of Asia. The process started when Japan faced the military defeat of the neighboring China. We also have to study the characteristics of Japan's modernization, taking into consideration the developments of China-Japan relations afterward. By so doing, we will be able to learn valuable lessons from history and think about how new international order should be in the 21st century.

## II.

Japan's modernization during and after the Meiji Restoration, was promoted under strong guidance by the central government under the national policies of "*fukoku kyôhei* (Enrich the Country and Strengthen the Military)" and "*shokusan kôgyô* (Increase Production and Promote Industry)". These modernization efforts were virtually equal to Westernization efforts. At least, during the Meiji era (1868-1912), Japan became the only successful Asian country in Westernization and was recognized as one of dominant members of international order controlled by powerful Western countries. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) was the first epoch-making event for Japan's development as imperialist nation. A leading thinker and journalist of the period was Tokutomi Sohô (1863-1957).

Sohô made his debut to the circle of leading journalists with "*Shôrai no Nihon* (The Future Japan)" in 1886. He launched a "*Kokumin no tomo* (The Nation's Friend)" magazine and a "*Kokumin shimbun* (The Nation Newspaper)" newspaper under the banner of "*heimin shugi* (populism)" and came to have great influence in the circle. *Heimin shugi* advocated liberalism, egalitarianism, and pacifism, demanding Westernization from the bottom to counter the Westernization from the top imposed by the central government. Within a decade after he made his debut, however, Sohô became a passionate advocate of imperialism and authoritarianism after the Sino-Japanese War.

Sohô wrote "*Dai Nihon bôchô ron* (On the Expansion of Greater Japan) (December, 1894)" in the midst of the Sino-Japan War. In this essay, he championed the significance of the war as follows: For ourselves, it is to open up and emancipate Japan. For others, it is to deal a major blow to bigotry in the world and insert the light of civilization to barbarous society<sup>(3)</sup>. On the other hand, Soho emphasized the justice and legitimacy of starting the war, asserting that it was a war for Japan, as a "harbinger of civilization", "expander of humanitarianism", and "missionary of light", to "civilize" the bigotry and barbarous Qing dynasty that had subordinated Korea, claiming the traditional suzerainty. Needless to say, the justification of the war was intended not only to the adversary Qing, but also to the Western civilized countries to obtain their approval of and support for starting the war. It was in this sense that Sohô stressed that "our people are bleeding to spread justice over four seas."<sup>(4)</sup>

On the other hand, on top of the civilizing and humanitarian stance to spread justice over four seas, it must be noted that Sohô boldly and candidly identified his country's national requirement as "to open up and emancipate Japan". What did he mean by "to open up and emancipate Japan"? He meant a great leap in national goals and challenges from "contracting Japan" to "expanding Japan". In other words, if we consider the Meiji Restoration that declared "openness and progressiveness" as the first leap from territorialism and hierarchy under the shogunate system to national unity, the Sino-Japanese War would be the second leap to play an active role in the world, following the successful national unity achieved by *Haihan Chiken*, abolishing domains and establishing prefectures, proclaiming the Constitution of the Great Japanese Empire, and establishing the Diet. It was also described as a leap from "national life" to "global life". That is, "to enter into global operation on the foundation of national spirit". The very significance of the war with Qing was to "establish a base of national expansion" in the Orient and mark the first step to hold an equal positioning to powerful Western countries and "compete in the world arena". In other words, it revealed the ambition to expand influence in Asia and beyond and join the circle of powerful Western countries.

How far he has gone from the justification from the standpoint of civilization and humanitarianism to the bald advocacy of external expansion of the nation! They apparently show stark contrast, and of course, Sohô focused on the latter. He explained the message of the book in the "preface" as follows: "70% to 80% of this book is about conquest of Qing. However, it is not talking about expansion of Greater Japan in the framework of conquest of Qing, rather discussing conquest of Qing in the framework of expansion of Greater Japan. It is not that conquest of Qing comes first of expansion, but that expansion comes first of Qing. Intellectual minds would know the right order of cause and result."<sup>5)</sup> Thus, he was truly blunt. Expansionism is neither the objective nor a result of "conquest of Qing". The Sino-Japanese War was a great opportunity that was brought about as "natural course of events" to the Japanese people whose destiny and mission is to expand. It was nothing but a "golden opportunity for an expanding Japan to engage in expansionist activities". "There is expansionism, hence conquest of Qing." That is the basic stance of Sohô illustrated in "Dai Nihon bôchô ron". It can also be said that expansion had become autotelic.

For Sohô, Japan's modernization was on the same track as Asian invasion. It is a clear indication of establishment of Japanese imperialism. Such a modernization course as an imperialist country came to be a generally accepted public opinion, if not as crude as Sohô's, after the Sino-Japanese War.

However, there were some who opposed the idea of the modernization of the imperialist Japan. Uchimura Kanzô (1861-1930) was one of such leading critics. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, Uchimura considered it as "a war for a good cause". He published "Justification of the Korean War" in English to obtain wide support of the Western people. The Japanese translation of the essay was carried in the September 1894 edition of

"*Kokumin no tomo*" published by Sohô. However, angered by immorality of Japanese society after the victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Uchimura later published an essay titled "*Jisei no kansatsu* (Observation of the Trend)" in the August 1896 edition of "*Kokumin no tomo*". In this essay, Uchimura criticized the then trend as follows: "Once the country victoriously ended the war, its proclaimed major objective of independence of neighboring countries are no longer at issue. In fact, exploration of new territories and expansion of new markets have grasped the national attention. Thus, they are trying hard to squeeze as many benefits as possible out of the victory. If it is truly a war for a good cause, why don't they fight to the end even at the risk of the country's existence? If the Japanese are a people of high moral, why don't they appreciate the honor of our fellow Chinese people? Why don't they make efforts to guide the neighboring Korea? My sorrow is because our people are not honest. They champion justice without believing in justice. The kindness of the Japanese people to neighboring countries is just a lip service, not coming from the bottom of their heart."

It is an accusation by Uchimura from the viewpoint of humanitarianism as a pious Christian. In the same essay, he criticized the Greater Japan Expansionism and asserted that to morally enhance the "lesser Japan" should be the course for Japan's modernization. Regarding the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), he also pursued a "pacifist campaign" with a small number of socialists such as Kôtoku Shûsui (1871-1911) and Sakai Toshihiko (1871-1933).

### III.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Japan established the imperialist national regime with the victory of the Russo-Japanese War. Externally, Japan joined the leading brass of imperialistic international order established by powerful Western nations. Japan annexed Korea (1910), established tariff autonomy (1911), and fought World War I (1914-18) as a member of the Allied Forces. After the war, Japan held a permanent membership in the League of Nations council, securing a stronger voice in the international political arena as one of the five major countries. By the word of Tokutomi Sohô, a hard-lining imperialist, the Sino-Japanese War was "the time when the Japanese people woke up as an imperialist nation", whereas the Russo-Japanese War as "the time when Japan was recognized as an imperialist nation by the world"<sup>(6)</sup>.

Meanwhile, in China, which was a greatest target of the Japanese imperialist ambition, the 1911 Revolution broke out and a republican China was established. After the autocracy of Yuan Shikai, there was a period of internal wars among various military cliques. The May 4 Movement occurred in 1919, since when movements for national revolution had gained momentum. How did Japan see this tide of Chinese nationalism? From the bilateral perspective of the imperialist Japan, enlightenment of the Chinese people must have been a great obstacle in its way of invasion. Meanwhile, in the global context, on the one hand, Japan joined the imperialist international

order that had been controlled by the West, and on the other hand, as nationalist sentiment of Asian peoples, especially that of the Chinese, was mounting, emerging nation states started joining the international order controlled by powerful imperialist countries. The Paris Peace Conference was held, where the five major nations of Britain, U.S., France, Italy, and Japan played major roles. It should be noted, however, that China attended the Conference as a member of the Allied Forces, too. The Chinese delegation led by Diplomatic Chief Lu Zhengxiang (1871-1949) comprised with young Gù Wéijūn (1888-1985), Shi Zhaoji (1877-1958), and Wang Zhengting (1882-1961). All of them graduated from American universities. The composition of the delegation was symbolic of the time. Without referring to the success of the Russian Revolution, I would like to point out that a multi-layer structure was being created in establishing international order after World War I, where not only powerful imperialist nations, but also delegates of repressed peoples could have a voice. It can be safely said that even though it had not grown into a strong-enough momentum, it was marking an important turning point.

Therefore, Japan had to keep an eye on the development of Chinese nationalism and properly assess it, as well as handle the situation as part of leading forces in international society, while having.

Let's take Nagai Ryūtarō (1881-1944) to review the situation at that time. Nagai graduated from Waseda University in 1905 and enrolled in Oxford University. After finishing studying at Oxford University, he came back to Waseda University in 1909 to become a professor of social and colonization policies. He was also appointed as editor-in-chief and managing editor of a "*Shin Nippon* (New Japan)" magazine presided over by Ōkuma Shigenobu in 1911. Nagai was elected as member of the lower house of the Diet in 1920 and afterward re-elected for seven times in a row. He belonged to *Kenseikai* (Constitutional Association) and *Rikken Minseitō* (Constitutional Democratic Party). He served as Counselor of Foreign Affairs from 1924 to 27 and as Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1929 to 31. Thus, he was in an important position to support the so-called "Shidehara cooperative diplomacy".

Nagai published "*Hi tenka taihei ron* (Theory against Peace of the World)" in the January 1912 edition of "*Shin Nippon*". In this essay, he identified three "greatest political issues" to be solved in the 20th century: First, emancipation of repressed peoples; second, liberation of proletariats; and third, liberation of women. He thought these three movements were important because they shared a characteristic of movements "for the weak to break free of the strong's repression and emancipate themselves to their own land". The first movement spread from India, to Egypt, to Persia, and to China, demanding emancipation of non-white ethnicities from the repression by the white. Nagai made a special reference to the significance of the 1911 Revolution of China as follows: It was "a prelude of voluntary movements to turn China into a China for the people of China". He pointed out the significance is in that it was not "repetition of autocracy" by replacing a dynasty

by another dynasty, but that the people were demanding a change into constitutionalism and democracy where the people could be their own master by “fundamentally reforming the political system”. He also said: “If we compared the latest revolution in China to other historical revolutions, it would be a tremendous mistake. Either it was by a peaceful abdication, by an overthrow of a dictator, or by an uprising, all the political upheavals in the past had simply been aimed at replacing the ruler before the latest revolution. The same old autocracy had been repeated as political system for several millennia. By contrast, the latest revolution was not aimed at such a petty objective as replacement of dynasties. But its ambition was to fundamentally reform the Chinese political system and reap benefits of strengthening the country by changing law and institutions that the people had been longing for since the Russo-Japanese War.”

In this way, in recognition of the epoch-making significance of the 1911 Revolution, Nagai expressed empathy and expectation to the new China. He tried to develop his theory and published “*Shinajin ni kawarite nihonjin o warau bun* (An essay to laugh at the Japanese on behalf of the Chinese)” in the January 1913 edition of “*Chûô Kôron* (The Central Review)”. In the essay, Nagai first harshly criticized the Japanese for their superficial understanding of the Chinese revolution, saying: “The current Japanese styled themselves as the world's great people just because the country has won a few wars. They can not reflect upon themselves, nor can they learn about enemies. Even the Chinese revolution, the Japanese sneeringly consider it as a mere venture by the Chinese to prove themselves. The escalation of the imperialistic pride provoked by the victory of the Russo-Japanese War is developing the self-righteous sense of superiority over other Asian peoples, growing the contempt upon China that has been spread across the country since the Sino-Japanese War, and making the Japanese turning blind eyes to the awakening of “the Chinese people to their own power“. Thus, Nagai lamented arrogance of the Japanese at that time.

This essay was published about the time when the first movement for protection of the Constitution, claiming “*Hanbatsu daha, kensei yôgo* (Overthrow Domain Clique, Protect Constitutional Government),” was about to culminate. Nagai pointed out that even the tide of the so-called “Taishô Democracy” would not go beyond the self-righteousness at least from the global perspective, if it were to develop without proper understanding of the liberation movements of other Asian peoples. Thus, he demanded self-assessment of the imperialist Japan.

Particularly, after World War I, Nagai took note that the people's liberation movement had been spreading to the ordinary people since the May 4 Movement in 1919 and expressed his understanding of the Chinese national revolution. Nagai was appointed Senior Counselor of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet of Kato Takaaki launched in 1924, by which he came to hold an important position to support the Shidehara diplomacy. For instance, in a round-table discussion<sup>(7)</sup> with Yoshino Sakuzô, Hasegawa Nyozeikan, and others carried in the November issue of a “*Kaizô* (The Reconstruction)”

magazine of the same year, Nagai was quoted as saying on the trend toward the national revolution, "I think it is rather promising." He also expressed his opinion as follows: "I think we have to set Japan's policy toward China in a way as to help develop this voluntary movement as naturally as possible." He even asserted that as long as taking this fundamental stance, it is a natural course to adopt a foreign policy of noninterference in internal affairs of other countries, and that "whether or not taking a noninterference policy is of Japan's national interest is a secondary question." On the characteristic of the "trend of revolution", Nagai aptly pointed out its structural trait as follows: Since the military cliques and huge capitalists are joining forces with imperialist powers in act of treachery and comprador, "in China, a liberation movement of the Chinese people based on national awakening and a liberation movement from capitalism demanding economic independence are carried out by the people against the same people. Therefore, the Chinese revolution is a patriotic revolution and social revolution at the same time."

It should not be ignored that the noninterventionist policy of the Shidehara cooperative diplomacy was adopted based on not only a logic of imperialist international order of coordinated policies with the U.S. and Britain, but also, in one aspect, understanding of people's nationalism in which a "patriotic revolution" and a "social revolution" were blended.

#### IV.

A branch of thought that further developed the understanding of the Chinese nationalism was "*Shô-nihon shugi* (Smaller-Japanism)" advocated by Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973). *Shô-nihon shugi* was, as mentioned earlier, advocated by Uchimura Kanzô after the Sino-Japanese War. During the Taishô Democracy period, it was remarkable as a consistent message coming from "*Tôyô keizai shimpô* (Eastern Economic Review)". Miura Tetsutarô (1874-1972), vice-editor-in-chief of the magazine, said in his essay, "*Dai-nihon shugi ka, shô-nihon shugi ka* (Greater Japanism or Smaller Japanism!)", carried in the April to June editions of 1913 that we should avoid "*dai-nihon shugi*" based on militarism, totalitarianism, and nationalism as much as possible. He also championed conversion to "*shô-nihon shugi*" with industrialism, liberalism, and individualism at the core and advocated renouncing vested interest overseas and cut down on the military build-up. From this viewpoint of *shô-nihon shugi*, Ishibashi denounced the Japanese military's invasion of Qing Dao in China<sup>(8)</sup> when Japan joined battles in World War I. He also harshly criticized the Japanese government for its "crude expansionist policy" and "flippant national union theory" when the public opinions were flaring up<sup>(9)</sup>.

Capturing an opportunity of the Washington Conference (1921-22), which was held after the war to cut down on the military build-up and secure stability and order in the Asia-Pacific region in line with international cooperation, Ishibashi also demanded awakening from "*dai-nihon shugi no gensô* (Illusion of Greater-Japanism)". He argued that *dai-nihon shugi* that tried to



expand territory or clout outside the Japanese soil would not only provoke a backlash from other Asian peoples, but also make it difficult to secure understanding of powerful Western nations, and that it would not be of Japan's national interest from the perspective of her economic development. Thus, he denounced the illusion. He held that it would be more beneficial, if Japan liberated her colonies ahead of the Western nations and renounce the vested interest to restore confidence of other Asian peoples and establish friendly relations. He asserted that in the midst of the growing ethnic awakening in East Asia, leading to an independence movement in Korea, moves to demand establishment of parliament in Taiwan, and an anti-Japan movement in China, "they would not abandon the movements until they would be satisfied in one way or another". Therefore, he demanded for disillusion from "Illusion of Great-Japanism" because "it would be wiser to quickly renounce what we should anyway soon or later"<sup>(10)</sup>.

In this way, Ishibashi demanded a correction of such Japanese path of modernization as competing for hegemony as a leader of the imperialist international order. According to his essay on the "*Kome sôdô* (Rice riots of 1918)" on the imperialist Japan's own soil, Ishibashi asserted that even though the direct cause might have been a price hike of rice, the root cause was that "while our political system worked very well for a limited number of affluent people, it is barely useful for the majority of proletariats"<sup>(11)</sup>. Therefore, the people no longer have confidence in the government's policies and tried to protect and salvage their own livelihood by themselves. That was what the uprising was all about. In this sense, he maintained, it was not at all neither accidental nor simplistic. His claim can be considered to have demanded to break from the modernization course aiming at national expansion to East Asia under the banner of *fukoku kyôhei* and correct the course toward the stability and enhancement of the people's life and mutual understanding of Asian peoples.

The main forum that Ishibashi Tanzan expressed his opinions was "Tô-yô keizai shimpô". Tanzan advocated *shô-nihon shugi* --- pacifism and policy to enhance the people's live --- democracy based on the economic rationalism. Yoshino Sakuzô (1878-1933), who led the Taishô Democracy advocating *minpon shugi* (people-as-the-base-ism), mainly published his opinions through "Chuô kôron", a general magazine targeted at a wider range of readers. He published "Kokka seikatsu no isshin (Drastic Renewal of People's Lives)" and "*Seijigaku no kakushin* (Reform of Politics)" in the January 1920 edition of "Chuô kôron". In the former essay, he said, "We are now recognizing that the political concept that *fukoku kyôhei* is the only or at least primary ideal is changing as a result of the recent war." In the latter, he held, "Now that the time has changed. *Fukoku kyôhei* is no longer the only ideal of the people's lives. The time has gone when we must embrace the mandatory organization in itself as the absolute value." It is important because in "*Kensei no hongî o toite sono yûshû no bi o nasu no michi o ronzu* (On the Meaning of Constitutional Government and the Methods to Reflect it)<sup>(12)</sup>", in which he developed a systematic argument on *minpon shugi*, he wrote,

“*Mimpon shugi* meant that the government should act on behalf of the popular welfare and that the people, through the mechanisms of elections and responsible cabinets, should be the ultimate judge of whether it did so”. He said these were the two principles of *mimpon shugi*. To be more specific, he advocated expansion of suffrage to the ordinary people and realization of popular election, establishment of a parliamentary cabinet system and multiple political party system, and promotion of people's diplomacy. Two years later, he published “*Mimpon shugi no igi o toite futatabi kensei no yūshū no bi o nasu no michi o ronzu* (On the Meaning of *Mimpon shugi* and the Methods of Reflect of the Constitutional Government Again)”<sup>(13)</sup> (Ibid., 1918). In this essay, he said that of the two principles, the second was the “absolute principle”, but that the first was a “relative principle” that needed coordination with “nationalist thought” and “concept of community”. In this way, his claim included harmony and compromise with nationalism. However, domestically, the rice-riots lead to full-blown popular movements, and internationally, moves toward international cooperation occurred after World War I. Particularly, there were many events indicating growing nationalism of other East Asia peoples, including the March First Independence Movement in Korea and the May Fourth Movement in China. Facing the reality, it seems that Yoshino himself was released from the fetter of nationalism. On the Chinese May Fourth Movement, he rightly pointed out that the emerging popular forces such as students, youth, merchants and manufacturers, and labors were becoming the mainstream of the revolutionary movements.<sup>(14)</sup> In the opening remark of the Third Lecture of Reimeikai (Dawn Society) titled “*Mazu jiko o hansei seyo* (First, Reflect upon Yourself)”<sup>(15)</sup>, he demanded that before taking a hostile attitude toward nationalism in Korea and China and playing down the moves as mere an agitation by some provocateurs, the Japanese should “reflect upon themselves” about Japan's imperialist diplomatic policies per se. He also asked to abandon the “old interpretation of history” and face squarely the “forces of overseas public opinions”, namely, “to move China, we must consider the Chinese people, and to move Korea, we must take the Korean people as our counterpart.”

Thus, Yoshino came to maintain that that “*fukoku kyōhei*” policy, which had been the political objective of Japanese modernization, was not “the only ideal of national life”. In other words, he asserted that the value and ideal that the human was searching for did not lie in national life, but in the very reality of the ordinary people's social life, and that the role of the government was relativised as a mere means of achieving value = welfare in social life. Which led to the denouncement of imperialism advocated in “*Dai-nihon shugi*” that put the absolute priority on national expansion. In this way, Yoshino had a common perspective with Nagai who considered the popular trend of the Chinese revolution as “nationalist revolution” as well as “social revolution”.

## V.

Meanwhile, the stance that highly considered people's social and living

values as a precondition of a nation's existence was also emphasized by Sun Wen (1866-1925), the leader of the Chinese Revolution, though the constructions of logic were different. For instance, he visited Japan in 1924, when *Kuomintang* (National Party) and the Chinese Communist Party joined forces. On November 28, he gave a lecture, "*Dai ajia shugi* (Great Asianism)", in Kôbe. In the lecture, he acknowledged the significance of the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in that it had given great hope and courage to other Asian peoples. Then, he asked, what is necessary as principles for liberation or self-reliance of Asian peoples? He emphasized the tradition of "royal road" in contrast to the culture of "hegemony" of powerful Western nations. That is, the principle of "utilitarianism and power" vs. the principle of "benevolence and moral". In other words, it can be said that it was a stance that appreciated culture and integrity formed by values in ordinary people's social life as asserted by Yoshino and others. By contrast, the stance of hegemony puts emphasis on sovereignty, which leads to invasion of other countries externally and repression of its own people internally. Sun Wen said, "Any nation that seeks hegemony not only represses nations and peoples outside Europe, but also represses them in its own country and within Europe just in the same way."<sup>(16)</sup>

He did not made a direct mention in this lecture, but the reference of "*Sanmin shugi*" in the footnote explains as follows: "If we want to prove by Chinese political history, the Chinese would say that the royal road means to follow the nature. In other words, the power of nature is the royal road. A group formed by the royal road. That is a people. The arms is hegemony, and a group formed by hegemony is a nation."<sup>(17)</sup> A group different from a nation as a structure of force, which is the description of a "people", can safely be said to indicate various social groups that are non-authoritative, where, he asserted, lies the foundation of popular and national unity. That is the essence of "Great Asiaism". Sun Wen concluded the lecture in Japan with the following question.

"You, the Japanese people, have already obtained the culture of hegemony originated in the West, as well as the essence of the culture of royal road inherent in Asia. For the future international culture, would you like to be an agent of the Western hegemony, or would you like to be a stronghold of the Eastern royal road? That is for you, the Japanese people, to decide carefully."<sup>(18)</sup>

Not only government-to-government relations, but also mutual friendly relations between nationals or peoples should be appreciated. In this sense, the spirit of Ishibashi Tanzan, Yoshino Sakuzo and others, and Sun Wen must have had something in common. Such spirit will be more and more important not only in the Chinese-Japanese relationship, but also in the global scope in the 21st century world.

- 
- (1) Katsu Kaishû, 'Rikugun Rekishi', *Katsu Kaishû Zenshu vol. 15* (Keisô Shobô, 1976) p.5.
  - (2) Ibid., p.99.
  - (3) 'Dai-nihon Bôchô-ron', *Meiji Bungaku Zenshû vol. 34, Tokutomi Sôhō shû* (Chikuma Shobô, 1974) p.255.
  - (4) Ibid., p. 255.
  - (5) Ibid., p. 245.
  - (6) 'Taishô no Seinen to Teikoku no Zento (Youth of the Taishô Era and the Future of the Empire)' (1916), *Kindai Nippon Shisô Taikei 8: Tokutomi Sohō shû*, (Chikuma Shobô, 1978) p.190.
  - (7) 'Taishi Kokusaku Tôgi', *Kaizô* (Nov., 1924)
  - (8) 'Chintao wa Danjite Hoyu Subekarazu', *Tôyô Keizai Shimpô* (Nov., 1914)
  - (9) 'Kakon o Nokosu Gaikô Seisaku', *Tôyô Keizai Shimpô* (May, 1915)
  - (10) 'Dai-nihon Shugi no Gensô', *Tôyô Keizai Shimpô* (Jul. to Aug., 1921)
  - (11) 'Sôjô no Seiji-teki Igi', *Tôyô Keizai Shimpô* (Sep., 1918)
  - (12) *Chûô Kôron* (Jan., 1916)
  - (13) Ibid., (Jan., 1918)
  - (14) 'Pekin Daigaku Gakusei Sôjô ni tsuite', *Shinjin* (June, 1919)
  - (15) *Reimei Kôen shû, Dai 3 shû* (May, 1915)
  - (16) *Sekai no Meicho 78: Son-bun, Mō-takutô*, Chûkô Bakkusu, (1980) P. 266.
  - (17) Ibid., p. 77.
  - (18) Ibid., p. 266.