

Implications of U.S. Dominance in Global Politics *

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“.....While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country,”¹

The 21st century started with a prospect that it was going to be “the second ‘American Century’”². The United States was leading the world in terms of politics, military, economy, science, and other fields. It looked as if it were an “emperor” of a “world empire”. On September 11 of the third millennium, however, a shocking event that jolted its impregnable position occurred. That was “simultaneous terrorist attacks” on the American soil by an international terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda.

Needless to say, the inhumane surprise attacks caused profound grief to people all over the world. The perpetrators did not mind taking whatever means to an end. At the same time, however, the attacks made the world aware that even such a super power as the United States could not be an almighty “God’s country”. That was felt most keenly by the U.S. government, which immediately embarked on a thorough review of homeland security measures. On September 20, 2002, about a year after the attacks, President George W. Bush issued a policy guideline titled “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”. The quotation at the beginning of this article is from the document.

It must be noted that the Bush (Jr.) administration clearly showed an attitude that the U.S. does not hesitate to launch a preemptive attack unilaterally, if necessary. “A preemptive attack” means a “preemptive defense” in terms of the international law. That is, the U.S. can launch a preemptive attack, if a threat exists, even before it is attacked by an external force. Nonetheless, the U.S. had abstained to exert the right of self-defense since the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928. The Bush (Jr.) administration has shifted from its traditional course in response to the tragedy of 9-11.

It would be understandable that the U.S. had to change the course after it suffered serious damages by the unprecedented terrorist attacks. Still, the U.S. is a super power with dominant military capabilities. If such a dominant power does not hesitate to attack first, it would have enormous influence over global politics. Many other countries will have to be nervous to every move the U.S. makes. Can such a system where the U.S. enjoys unrivalled dominance contribute to world peace? This article is an attempt to find a kind of answer.

1. What drives the U.S. to “unilateralism”? --- Its sources³

It can not be denied that foreign policies of the Bush (Jr.) administration have an inclination towards what is called “unilateralism”. The nature of this administration clearly shows in the “Bush Doctrine”, which does not rule out a possibility of a “preemptive attack” to protect the homeland. However, the “unilateralism” is not

necessarily a unique characteristic of the Bush administration alone. It has been a long-standing tradition in U.S. foreign policies and did not appear out of the blue. Many administrations in the past had similar characteristics, though in different degrees and with different details. Then, why is it the case? It has close link to how the United States has developed as a nation.

When it won independence from the U.K., the U.S. upheld ideals of “freedom”, “equality”, and “democracy”. It aimed at building a new republic different from class-societies in Europe. As to foreign policies, the U.S. denied the value of power politics as existed in the “Old World” and tried to isolate itself as much as possible in terms of political and military relations. The “Monroe Doctrine” in 1823 is a public declaration of such a mindset, which laid a foundation of the U.S. foreign policies of “isolationism”. The U.S. had taken in principle this kind of introversive policies until World War II, except for the Spanish-American War and World War I.

Admittedly, “isolationism” has been a tradition of U.S. foreign policies, but that is not all. As the occasion demands, the U.S. takes a different approach. If the U.S. finds it necessary to be engaged in an international affair, it shifts from “isolationism” to “internationalism”. Still, its diplomatic behaviors are quite different from other countries’. Here again, the reason has much to do with the formation of the U.S. as a nation.

U.S. nationals are, except for native Americans and slaves, mostly immigrants who have come to the country in search of American dreams of their own and their descendants. For them, the U.S. is not a given place, but “where they had chosen to be by their own will”. Therefore, they want to praise the United States as the only ideal nation on earth in absolute terms. In its extreme form, such a mindset works in a way similar to religious creeds. In such a case, they come to feel a “sense of mission” to spread their beliefs to others. That is why the U.S. defies values of “the Old World”, while it does not hesitate to “propagandize” values of “the New World” to other places on earth. Of course, it does not blindly conduct “propagation activities”, but does so when necessary. Still, the way it does so is quite similar to that of “evangelicals”.

Then, what kind of evangel is the U.S. trying to spread to the world? That is the national ideal of the U.S., with “liberal democracy” and “free economy” as two pillars. The former was typically manifested in the cause for the war against Germany during World War I, when the U.S. abandoned its existing policy of neutralism. President Woodrow Wilson upheld “a war for democracy”, “a war for freedom”, and “a war for justice to rule the world” as reasons for participating the war and mobilized the people. A prominent example of the latter would be when the U.S. was trying to enter the Chinese market in the late 19th century and the early 20th century. At that time, the U.S. requested the great powers that had already had many vested interests in China to adopt “principles”. That is, the then Secretary of State John Hay called for “open-door”, “equal opportunities”, and “territorial integration” in China. These were nothing but U.S. trade principles.

When the U.S. makes an extroversive move under “internationalism”, it is often the case that it ignores complicated interests and situations of other countries and tries to put everything into a framework of ideals that it upholds. The American way of thinking tends to be a dichotomy where the American values are “good”, and the

opponent's values are "evil". For example, Wilson's external policies are generally considered to have been based on an idea of internationalism because he advocated that a world order after World War I should be a collective security arrangement. In this regard, he contributed to establishment of the League of Nations. Nonetheless, Wilson's view of world order through the collective security arrangement was based on the U.S. political ideals. Meanwhile, Wilson called for "a world ruled by justice", but it was the "justice" measured by the American values. Therefore, Wilsonianism would ultimately lead to a "monistic world", where the American values prevail. Thus, even though his foreign policies might have taken on some characteristics of internationalism, there was a possibility that Wilson would take a course of "unilateralism" for the ultimate purpose of realizing American values.

2. *Impulse for a "monistic world" based on "Americanism"*

The U.S. continued perceiving the world as a dichotomy and tried to sublimate them into a "monistic world" after World War II. The U.S. had loathed the Axis nations, namely, Japan, Germany, and Italy, as "evil" of totalitarianism. It joined World War II in the middle of the course and succeeded in expelling the "evil". After that, the U.S. attempted to stay away from the international community for some time.

About that time, however, the Soviet Union with the aim of building a communist society, was strengthening its clout in surrounding countries. For the U.S., whose national creed is liberalism, the Soviet Union was regarded as another form of totalitarianism. Naturally, it could not turn a blind eye to the expansionist endeavor by the Soviet Union. In March 1947, the then President Harry Truman described the international situation literally in terms of a dichotomy of "liberalism vis-à-vis totalitarianism (communism)". Thus, he staged a fight against a new "evil" to support people who were deprived of freedom in the totalitarian atmosphere. This was the onset of what we now know as the "Cold War". The U.S. as a "champion of freedom" tried to "contain" the communism with its huge military capabilities. Though it suffered a bitter experience in the Vietnam War before the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, the U.S. continued its "mission" until it eventually prevailed.

For the U.S., the victory in the Cold War was proof of supremacy of liberalism. In fact, Francis Fukuyama, a third-generation Japanese American, contributed an article to a summer issue of the "National Interest" magazine in 1989. His article was shocking because it praised universality of liberal democracy and asserted that unless a new ideological system takes over it, liberal democracy has brought "an end to history" at the level of thought.⁴ Such a "theory of the end of history" could be interpreted as "eschatology" of the social system, which argues that the American-style liberal democracy will prevail all over the globe. The overwhelming victory in the first Gulf War in 1991 served to fortify Fukuyama's view of History. President George Bush (Sr.) went so far as boasting its role as "the world's policeman" in the State of the Union address that year, though the war was yet to be over. He said: "Among the nations of the world only the United State of America has had both the moral standing, and the means to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace."

Ironically, however, President Bush stumbled on management of domestic economy and was defeated by Bill Clinton in the presidential election in the following year. The Clinton administration gave recovery of the U.S. economy the highest priority and did not take active roles in international affairs. However, it is not to say that he tried to retreat to “isolationism” of the past. Clinton’s external policy was “to make the world prosperous by minimizing non-democratic countries and increasing democratic countries, and by spreading market economy all over the globe”.⁵ That was no doubt an “expansionist strategy” of “democracy” and “market economy”. This time, too, the impulse to “propagate” the “evangel” of “Americanism” to the world was in action.

3. *Emergence of “pluralistic world view” and suspicion about an “American Empire”*

The late 1990’s, which almost coincided with the second Clinton administration, saw rapid globalization in various areas. For example, many people in different places in the world had come to have access to the Internet. The U.S., which was a front-runner in the field of information technology, fully enjoined fruits of globalization and served as a driving force of the world economy. U.S. presence and influence were everywhere in the world. The world appeared to be monistic with the “American standard” being the “global standard”.

Admittedly, Americanization is a world trend. Yet, to expect that the whole planet will be transformed into an “American village” is too simplistic a view and short of insight into the history of human beings and humanity itself. Samuel Huntington sharply pointed it out in his “Clash of Civilizations”⁶. Huntington refused to see the post-Cold War world with the Fukuyama-style optimism as harmonized and “monistic” based on liberal democracy. Instead, he pointed to possibilities of confrontations and conflicts between different civilizations. Particularly, Huntington predicted, “the Western civilization vis-à-vis the Confucianism-Islam connection” would be a major source of clash.

The United States indulged itself in the victory in the Cold War. There was a prevailing illusion that various peoples on this planet would take on a characteristic of the “Uncle Sam”, as if they were cloned humans or robots. Huntington challenged such a prospect for an artificial or mechanical world and presented a “pluralistic world view” from the perspective of civilization. Taking into consideration that various ethnic, religious, and racial conflicts broke out after the Cold War⁷, he was quite right in some regard.

In spite of his profound insight, however, Huntington’s world view could not escape criticism as being too simplistic, either. It is because the “clash of civilizations” is not a universal rule that clashes are between different civilizations. For instance, the Northern Ireland conflict is a fierce confrontation between Catholic and Protestant, though both are in the same civilization zone. Similar situations can be observed in other places besides the Christian civilization zone. For example, there are conflicts between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. In the Kosovo conflict in 1999, a coalition force of the Western civilization zone supported the Albanian residents who belong to the Islam civilization zone. Therefore, the “theory of clash of civilizations”

does not necessarily articulate the world situation. Yet, it can be said that the “9-11” terrorist attacks have taken on an element of the “clash of civilizations”.

Questions to the “monistic world view” go beyond the fields of culture and civilization. Admittedly, the U.S. established an overwhelming superiority in both economic and military terms over a decade or so after the Cold War. The U.S. influence is now everywhere in the world. The U.S. looks like an empire, which is quite contrary to the ideal of its founding fathers. Some people now envy the U.S., and some criticize it. Even some U.S. citizens have started to give warnings. Chalmers Johnson is among those who have rung an alarm bell. Johnson, in the last year of the 20th century, considered the way the U.S. engaged itself in world affairs as that of “imperialist” and worried about its future as follows⁸. “The U.S. has built a network of military bases all over the world, controlled military situations in the world, and put the world economy under its influence by uniformly applying principles of the ‘neo-classic economics’. That is nothing but ‘hegemony of an empire’ and will inevitably produce blowbacks in variety of forms”⁹. He thus called on the U.S. to change its way of behavior.

The U.S. indeed could both explicitly and implicitly force its will upon other countries, using its huge military strength and the dollar as the world key currency. From other countries’ point of view, it works as “psychological coercion”, under which they find it hard to reject a U.S. request. Still, one should not put a label of “imperialist” on the U.S. so quickly, taking up the informal mechanism of coercion.

In the original definition, the “imperialism” meant “a phenomenon where industrialized nations in the West secured interests in their respective colonies and expanded their territories in the late 19th centuries and subsequent decades, whose archetype is imperialistic control systems (for example, the Roman Empire and the Napoleon Empire) with characteristics of rule over other ethnicities and expansion of territories.”¹⁰ Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has neither established a new colony nor expanded its territories. Meanwhile, in the field of economy, unlike the era of mercantilism, when the government and private companies worked together to enter overseas markets in an organized and systematic manner, the post-war U.S. has never behaved in such a way. The U.S. has advocated the “IMF-GATT (WTO)” regime because it has believed in leaving economic activities to the market mechanism and eliminating government interventions whenever possible. Therefore, the criticizing the U.S. as imperialistic is not adequate. Admittedly, there is always a possibility of falling into the “military-industrial complex” (collusion between the military and the business), as President Dwight Eisenhower cautioned when he retired. Yet, there are regulations to keep such moves in check. Therefore, if one really wanted to use the term “empire” for the U.S., he or she could at best call it as an “‘empire’ of liberal democracy”.¹¹

One might want to criticize both Huntington and Johnson as taking too simplistic a view on the issue, though in different ways. With the advent of the 21st century, however, relationship between the U.S. and the rest of the world surely took a drastic turn in a direction that the two professors worried.

4. *Contest between “unilateralism” and “multilateralism”, but*

The “9-11” terrorist attacks in 2001 are a symbolic incident, where “magma” of “anti-Americanism” which grew during the second Clinton administration blew out. The incident changed the U.S. dramatically.¹² Right after the attacks, President Bush (Jr.) apparently took it as a challenge to the Jewish-Christian civilization by the Islam civilization. The President, in a speech on the day of the terrorist attacks, quoted a line from the Book of Psalm, “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil”. Thus, he made it clear that the U.S. would not be intimidated by terrorism. In a short press release issued on September 16, he used the word, “crusade”, expressing a firm resolve in the war on terror. Such remarks of “religious connotations” came out probably because he is a Christian fundamentalist.¹³ Still, when he viewed the U.S. war on terror as a “crusade”, he was caught in a trap of the “clash of civilization”, as Huntington worried.¹⁴ An aide pointed it out, and President Bush (Jr.) retracted the remark on September 20, managing to free himself from the trap. He emphasized that the tragedy is not a confrontation with the Islamic or Arab world but a war on terror, embarking on an endeavor to expel a new “evil” after the Cold War.

It is usually a responsibility of the police to deal with terrorism. In the course of a normal procedure, if a terrorist is in a foreign country, the U.S. demands the country to hand over the suspect or asks for cooperation in investigation. It was not the case with “9-11” because the Taliban regime in Afghanistan supported the terrorist organization which carried out the attacks and did not function as the government of a sovereign state. Consequently, the Bush (Jr.) administration positioned the terrorist attacks as a “new war”, which defies the conventional definition under the international law. He started a war on October 8, 2001, to topple the Taliban regime and sweep the Al-Qaeda network. President Bush (Jr.) could be excused for taking such an action as having had no other choice under such circumstance.¹⁵ That is why most Americans supported policies of President Bush (Jr.), and many other countries willingly cooperated in the Afghan war. Even though operations to capture Osama bin Laden were not successful, the U.S. militarily won the war in a matter of a month.

The Bush administration, however, did not call an end of the “new war” with the victory in the Afghan war. Instead of dealing with the “9-11” tragedy as an isolated incident, the administration took this opportunity to launch an extended “war” on “terrorism-sponsoring nations” or “rogue states” all over the world. President Bush (Jr.) said in the State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, that the war on terror was only begun, and that the campaign might not be finished on their watch. He went so far as to call Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil” and denounced them.

President Bush (Jr.) hated Iraq most, or Saddam Hussein for that matter, among the “Axis of Evil”. It is because his father militarily won the first Gulf War but lost the presidential election for the second term in office. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein remained in power and continued to display naked hostility against the U.S. Consequently, President Bush (Jr.), partly for the sake of revenge on behalf of his father, chose Iraq as the No. 1 target in the “operation to eliminate the ‘Axis of Evil’”.¹⁶ Before embarking on that mission, however, the Bush administration had to clear some hurdles.

First, the cause of a U.S. attack on Iraq. The Bush administration argued that Iraq has close tie with Al-Qaeda and possessed weapons of mass destruction, so that there was a danger that such WMDs would end up in the hand of terrorists. Still, that was a weak rationale. Iraq did not directly attack the U.S. soil, as Al-Qaeda did. That did not set a condition for a war of self-defense in the conventional sense. Then, the “Bush Doctrine” came out in September 2002, which stipulates that if there is a threat to the U.S., it would not hesitate to launch a preemptive attack.

Secondly, how to obtain support of the international community, when the U.S. attacks Iraq according to the aforementioned “cause”. The administration studied a possibility of a unilateral action in this regard. Eventually, however, the option proposed by Secretary of State Collin Powell was adopted and it decided to present the matter to the United Nations for its deliberation. The U.N. Security Council on November 7, 2002, adopted the 1441 resolution, which called on Iraq to allow an unconditional inspection on WMDs and warned that if Iraq did not comply, it would cause “serious consequences”. An inspection was carried out according to the resolution, but no evidence was found to prove incompliance. As a result, “the international community was split into a group which approved use of force and a group called for a further inspection”.¹⁷ On February 24, 2003, the U.S., with support of the U.K. and Spain, presented a draft resolution for approval of use of force on Iraq to the Security Council, but met objections from such countries as France, Germany, and Russia. Then, the U.S. gave up obtaining an “endorsement” of the U.N.

President Bush (Jr.), on March 17, gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum which would expire in 48 hours. President Hussein rejected a compromise, and President Bush (Jr.) started a war named an “Operation Iraq Freedom” with support of the U.K. and some other countries. The gap between military capabilities of the two sides was obvious, and the U.S.-U.K. forces put Iraq under their control in a matter of one and a half months. President Bush (Jr.) issued a “declaration of the end of fighting” on May 1, though whereabouts of Saddam Hussein was unknown at that time. Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, which somehow marked an end of war in a narrow sense.¹⁸

The second Gulf War had an unsettling effect on international politics. From the “9-11” to the Afghan war, many countries strongly supported the “war on terror” advocated by the Bush (Jr.) administration and were willing to cooperate. The situation was different, however, for the second Gulf War. Some countries challenged legitimacy of the war and distanced themselves from the U.S. Of all countries, France and (West) Germany, which were on the same side during the Cold War, opposed the war. That was a blow to weaken unity of the “league against terror”.

What generated such a rift? Needless to say, different countries had different interests in Iraq. Having said that, it seems that the underlying issue was how the U.S. related itself to the rest of the world. The Bush (Jr.) administration initially tried to deal with the Iraq issue in harmony with the U.N. After it became clear that a U.N. endorsement was unlikely to be obtained due to objection from France and some other countries, the U.S. abandoned the U.N. and took a path of unilateralism. It seems that behind the changing of course was “neo-conservatives”¹⁹, who have a great clout on the Bush (Jr.) administration, and their world view.

Robert Kagan, a spearhead of “neo-con”, does not hesitate to define the American

world view as follows: “[T]he United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.”²⁰ It is nothing but “military-strength-almighty-ism”, and this is what drove the Bush (Jr.) administration to “unilateralism”.

It must be noted, however, that the world view of “neo-con” does not represent that of the U.S. as a whole. People on the liberal side are concerned that “neo-con” tends to be too arrogant, and that “unilateralism” would go too far. So, they called on the U.S. to take a path of “multilateralism”. Joseph S. Nye, a leading figure in the liberal camp, reasons as follows: “Multilateralism involves costs, but in the larger picture, they are outweighed by the benefits. International rules bind the United States and limit our freedom of action in the short term, but they also serve our interest by binding others as well.”²¹

In this way, there is a move in the U.S. to keep in check the arrogance of “unilateralism”. Yet, that is hardly a manifestation of a pluralistic world view. It is because the philosophy of liberalism is based on “liberal democracy” and “free market economy”. It also has a strong tendency towards “evangelism”, which tries to spread the American value to the rest of the world.²² The only difference between “neo-con” and “liberalism” is which they think is the more important between “hard power” and “soft power”. Both camps hardly question the leading role of the U.S. in the world. They consider it preferable, unless a new world system emerges to take over the dominance of the U.S. as the sole super power.²³

4. As a concluding remark

It can not be denied that the U.S. has suffered a vital damage by the “9-11” terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, like an immortal “super man”, the country shows up anywhere in the world to sweep terrorists or correct “rogue states”. If the U.S. is always on the side of justice, people on the planet will welcome the U.S. like the hero of the “Super Man” movie. In reality, however, the U.S. is a “super power”, not a “super man”. To expect the U.S. to behave like a perfect “super man” is to ignore the history of mankind.

At the same time, however, it is highly likely that the dominance of the U.S. as the sole super power will stay for some time.²⁴ Such a world order is far from an ideal in terms of equality of sovereignty. There are some ideas, however, that put stability above equality. For example, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is “an idea to allow the right to be nuclear-armed to limited countries and ban use of a nuclear weapon on non-nuclear powers”. It is a “second best idea that even though the treaty perpetuates superiority of the nuclear powers, it is better to reduce dangers of accidental use of a nuclear weapon”.²⁵

“Equality” and “stability” in world peace are often contradictory to each other. Admittedly, the world where the U.S. has unrivalled dominance is not how the world should be, but there is no such a thing as Shangri-La in international relations.²⁶ Having acknowledged the reality, should we accept the U.S. predominance in the world or not? The challenge facing us today is quite daunting.

* This paper is the English translation of my article, "Amerika Ikkyoku Shihai Taisei No Sekai Seijiteki Imiai," Toshiki Gomi and Kenji Takita, eds., *9·11 Igo No Amerika To Sekai*, Nanso-sha, 2004, pp.12-27. I am grateful to Mr. Masamichi Kishimura of Nanso-sha for allowing me to reproduce it.

Notes

- 1 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>
- 2 As for the concept of the term, "the second 'American Century'", see Toshiki Gomi and Kenji Takita, eds., *Gendai Amerika Gaikō No Tenkan Katei*, Nansō-sha, 1999, p.28.
- 3 For more detailed argument in this chapter, see *ibid.*, pp.13-22. Kōichi Mori, 'Jōji Busshu' No Atama No Nakami, Kōdan-sha Bunko, 2003, which discusses the characteristics of the Bush (Jr.) administration from a similar analytical viewpoint is also suggestive.
- 4 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16, Summer, 1989, pp.3-18. Also see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, The Free Press, 1992, which was based on the aforementioned article.
- 5 See a commentary on "Dokyumento (Document), Beikoku No Shingaikō Dokutorin Enzetsu", *Sekai Shūhō*, November 2, 1993 issue, p. 60. This document is a record of a lecture by Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at School of Advance International Studies of Johns Hopkins University on September 21, 1993.
- 6 For more details, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, 1996.
- 7 As an attempt to overcome confrontations of cultural pluralism as a precondition, Tamotsu Aoki, *Tabunka Sekai*, Iwanami Shinsho, 2003, will be a good reference.
- 8 For more details, see Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback*, Henry Holt And Company, 2000.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 284.
- 10 Osamu Tanaka, "Teikoku Shugi", Hitoshi Abe, Mitsuru Uchida, and Sakio Takayanagi, eds., *Gendai Seijigaku Shōjiten* (New edition), Yūhikaku, 1999, p. 314.
- 11 For a detailed argument in this regard, Kiichi Fujiwara, *Demokurashii No Teikoku*, Iwanami Shinsho, 2002, is suggestive.
- 12 As for the U.S. politics after 9-11, Toshiaki Miura, *Busshu No Amerika*, Iwanami Shinsho, 2003, is a good reference.
- 13 As to this remark, see Mori, *op. cit.*
- 14 Toshiki Gomi, "Bei Dōji Tero Wo Kangaeru", *Shinano Mainichi Shimbun*, September 14, 2001.
- 15 In this regard, Masakazu Yamazaki, *Amerika Ikkyoku Taisei Wo Dō Ukeireruka*, Chūōkōron-sha, 2003, pp.48-53, is suggestive.
- 16 According to Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, Simon & Schuster, 2002, Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, at a National Security Council meeting on the following day of 9-11, already were "committed to a policy that would make Iraq a principal target of the first round in the war on terrorism" (p.49). As to a remark that President Bush (Jr.) had the same idea, see Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, Free Press, 2004. The author attended the meeting right after the terrorist attack as chief anti-terrorism officer of the administration. As to detailed moves within the Bush (Jr.) administration towards the second Gulf War, Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon & Schuster, 2004, is a good reference.
- 17 Hisakazu Usui, "Sekai Seiji No Nakano Iraku Sensō", *Chūōhyōron*, No. 245, October 2003, p. 39.
- 18 It should be noted that it was just a military victory, not a political victory. According to the logic of the Bush (Jr.) administration, it can win a political victory only when Iraq, including terrorists, no longer poses a threat to the U.S. That is when Iraq has become like a Japan after World War II. Japan got out of the occupation and became independent in 1952. Since then, it has never become hostile to the U.S.
- 19 As to "neo con", see Miura, *op. cit.*, Chapters 3 & 5.
- 20 Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, Alfred A. Knopf, 2002, p.3.
- 21 Joseph S. Nye, JR., *The Paradox of American Power*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 158.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 23 Such a perspective is common among liberals in the U.S. See G. John Ikenberry (ed.), *America Unrivaled*, Cornell University Press, 2002.
- 24 As to a view that the U.S. predominance will not continue for a long time, see Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era*, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, and Emmanuel Todd, *Apres L'Empire*,

Gallimard, 2002.

25 Yamazaki, *op. cit.*, p.114.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 116.