

Commonality between *Have* Causatives and *Have* Adversatives in Terms of a Conceptual Model of Possession and Related Matters

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抽象的な所有概念を基礎とした使役の *have* 構文と被害の *have* 構文の共通性とその他

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使役の *have* 構文と被害の *have* 構文を中心に論考を加えた。例えば、*subject have object do something* の形の構文は主語が自分の利益になるように目的語に何かを影響を与える場合に使用する場合も目的語が何らかの行動を行い、その行動が主語の不利になる場合にも使用される。つまり、表面上は全く同じ構文でありながら、意味は正反対になることがあるということである。この現象をどのように考えるべきであろうか。本論文では両極端の意味の上に抽象的なスキーマ的な意味が存在し、具体的なレベルにおいて意味の違いが生じるという考え方を採用した。例えば、白色と黒色は彩度、色彩がないという点でほとんど同じカテゴリーである。つまり、ほとんど同じカテゴリーの類似の要素の間で初めて違いという概念が発生しやすいわけである。あまりにも違うカテゴリー間では（例えば、猫とコーヒー杯）違うという概念が発生しにくい。

本論ではこのような共通の概念の基盤が抽象的なレベルで存在し、具体的なレベルになったときに様々な意味の違いが生じるという考え方を採用した。*have* では抽象的なレベルで手に持つ (*abstract possession*)、という意味を指定し、そこから文脈などにより意味が分かれていくという考え方を採った。

キーワード：スキーマ 使役の意味を表す *have* 被害の意味を表す *have* 抽象的所

有概念

On the surface *have* causatives and *have* adversatives are held to have opposite ends of the meaning stream. Yet, the two constructions are in many cases formally identical down to the smallest form. The present paper proposes to resolve this apparent paradox by positing an underlying shared schema with the apparently two different meanings, emerging only with reference to specific situational features. This is comparable in the sense that the colors, ‘black’ and ‘white’, while showing an extreme contrast, also belong to the same general category of achromatic colors without hue. In short contrasts are most salient within a shared semantic field. We often remain unaware of the fact that we can subliminally recognize the sameness only in the context of the difference. If two entities are really far apart, (e.g. Japanese history and a cup of coffee), we generally cannot conceive of commonality between them with ease: the conception of the opposite requires a shared common background or conceived homogeneity.

Because of this conceived homogeneity, we can perceive the potentially opposite meanings within one word without affecting its general meaning. Here I will try to show that the extremely opposite meanings of *have* (namely causative and adversative) are superficial and are crucially dependent on a tacit understanding of abstract possession. It is more plausible and likely to be psychologically valid to assume that the concept of abstract possession serves as a common schema and various meanings naturally follow. At present as far as my knowledge is concerned, there is no paper that explicitly addresses *have* causatives and *have* adversatives from their common schema, abstract possession.

1. Causative *have* and adversative *have*

The verb *have* has two apparently entirely opposite meanings, namely causative and adversative. In this paper typical causative *have* constructions imply that causers cause something that is often beneficial to them; typical *have* adversatives imply that causers cause something that is often unpleasant for them

Have causatives and *have* adversatives are respectively exemplified by the following examples:

- (1) a. I'm ready to see Mr. Smith. Have him come in, please.
- b. He had us laughing all through the meal.¹⁾
- c. I won't have you telling me what to do.²⁾
- d. I must have my watch repaired.

- (2) a. I had a strange thing happen to me when I was fourteen.
b. It's lovely to have children playing in the garden again.
c. We had our roof blown off in the storm.
d. Kemal [...] could not bear to have Ricky Underwood or his friends insult Dana.
(examples (1a)-(1d), (2a)-(2c) from Swan 2005 §238; (2d) from Sheldon 2001: 38f.)

Observe the causative examples in (1) and adversatives in (2) have opposite meanings at the descriptive level. But it is rather unthinkable and nonplausible for a single lexeme to have entirely opposite meanings. It should be more natural and reasonable to assume that *have* causatives and adversatives have an abstract undifferentiated underlying meaning that prompts distinctive meanings. The assumption here is that the underlying basic, schematic meaning of *have* causatives and *have* adversatives is predetermined possession. The idea of predetermined possession seems to match both types of *have* constructions. For instance, holding a piece of ice in hand may lead to two different construals: one is the effect of melting ice by holding the possessed; the other is the effect that the possessor undergoes by holding a piece of ice (e.g. a sensation or feeling of coldness). In diagram possession seems to be assumed equivalent to *x* being in a relation of physical contact with *Y*, which may entail effects of *X* on *Y* (parallel to the causative interpretation), and/or effects of *Y* on *X* (parallel to the adversative interpretation). In this paper we assume that this physical experience of holding something in hand is the ultimate origin of the predetermined possession meaning and all the other meanings of *have*. The assumption can easily explain the phenomena manifested by the following sentences:

- (3) a. He had his girlfriend come to his place two days ago.³⁾
b. He had a stranger come to his place two days ago.

(3a) and (3b) have the same sentence structure and thus should tend to have the same meaning (Bolinger 1977). But (3a) predominantly has a causative interpretation and (3b) has a predominantly adversative interpretation. Provided that the only meaning of *have* in *have* causative and adversative constructions is predetermined possession and that the meaning of the whole sentence depends to a large extent on encyclopedic knowledge, the likely meaning shift between (3a) and (3b) can naturally be explained. Consider another example:

- (4) He had his right arm broken.⁴⁾

Without much context (4) is most likely interpreted as his obviously severe experience of the

arm having been broken, but in the context that he would like to avoid going to war, it may be interpreted as his asking someone to break his right arm possibly because he was too scared to break his own arm.

In (5) the conception of possession is even more schematic as the only possible construal; here the subject *you* only serves as possessing and thus experiencing some type of relevance to the situation *kids paying Nolan a dime each*.

- (5) So you had a couple of kids paying Nolan a dime each just to smell the fries on his breath.⁵⁾ (Kinney 2015: 28)

In parallel with the conception of causative and adversative, the idea of abstract possession may lead to a positive experience like *have a good time* or a negative one like the following:

- (6) a. Mr. Sandoval has been waiting for me and Rowley to show our faces in front of his house again so he can let us have it, but I'm not ready for that conversation just yet. (Kinney 2015: 16)[underline mine]
b. I swung back my fist and let him have it. (p.c. Robert Sigley)

If we take *have* as an abstract possession in the broadest sense, even *have* in present perfect might be reducible to our experience or involvement of or relevance to some situations going on. Consider the following:

- (7) a. You paid.
b. You have paid.⁶⁾

(7b) is an utterance by a bus driver in Berkeley, US in 2014 after I had paid about a dollar, which was all the US cash I had at that time, even though the ride should have cost more. She has accepted my situation. (7b) might be paraphrased as the case where you now possess the situation of your payment; so you are OK and all set.

2. Similarities between *have* and *on*⁷⁾

Also, since holding something in one's hand necessarily implies contact, some parallelism should be expected between *have* and the preposition *on*, which has 'contact' as part of its core meaning. Consider the following:

(8) He knocked on the door.

(9) We live on rice.

On in (8) indicates affectedness on the door, whereas *on* in (9) implies basis or support for continuation of life. Since affectedness and support show opposite directions (i.e. affectedness often implies pressure from above, whereas support often implies the idea of scaffolding from below), it may be that *on* simply has the meaning of ‘contact’ and such distinctive more concrete meanings as ‘affectedness’ and ‘support’ simply follow from various contexts. Now consider the following:

(10) a. The big truck is running on the cornfield.

b. The big truck is running on methane.

(Personal communication with Vyvyan Evans)

The apparent sentence structure of (10a) and (10b) is the same but they differ in preferred interpretation: (10a) may be more readily interpreted as ‘affected by’, whereas (10b) may be more readily interpreted as ‘supported by’. This may be explained by the assumption that *on* itself does NOT have distinctive meanings but only a vague idea of contact, which may well prompt the meaning of possession as one facet of the meaning of *on* (e.g. *I only had a few dollars on me*). This is also suggestive of some parallelism between *have* and *on*.

3. Permission and obligation of *get to*

Let us now turn to another somewhat related phenomenon. Although the phrase *get to* does not have the idea of possession or contact, it may also show alternative conception of the same structure or form. Consider the following:

(11) a. Tom gets to go to Disneyland this summer. (LAAD 2000: 606)

b. The only available socket was in an awkward place. But when your battery is at 15% you gotta do what you gotta do. (Kinney 2018: 31)

Permission and obligation are parallel with causative and adversative in the sense that the formers imply the subject’s wish and the latters the subject’s unwillingness, both of which cases are apparently quite puzzling phenomena. This case is another manifestation of the same form with oppositely distinctive meanings. The only possible solution is to posit common valid schematic definitions or meanings at the extremely abstract level and assume that they just differ

depending on specific contexts. *Getting to do something* suggests at a schematic level that the trajector is moving toward doing some place or something and it will probably be completed. All the details will be elaborated depending on scenes.

4. Getting to someone

In the same vein, the connection between section 3 and the case of *getting to someone* is obvious. The analysis is exemplified by the following:

- (12) a. The whole business began to get to me after a while. (Free Dictionary)
b. Sad music gets to me and makes me cry. (Free Dictionary)

(12a) suggests the business annoys me as in *something gets on my nerves*. On the other hand, the situation described in (12b) is that sad music pleases me and makes me happy as in *good music has touched me (in a positive way)*. As in the case of *on*, coming in contact might lead to a positive outcome or negative one. The concept of contact itself is not biased in either way at a schematic level; with only linguistic or social conventions, either one of the interpretations might be more predominant.

5. Exclusionary fallacy

Finally let us now turn to the idea of exclusionary fallacy proposed by Lancker (1987: 28-31). His basic idea is that it is wrong to assume that something has to be one and not the other; it is perfectly reasonable and quite plausible to assume that two or more conceptions often coexist. In our ice examples, it is perfectly possible and plausible for effects of X on Y and effects of Y on X to coexist at the same time. The example (3a) may well trigger a likely interpretation where he asked his girlfriend to come to his place depending on the widely accepted general knowledge of boyfriend and girlfriend relationships, but it is also possible that he somewhat reluctantly asked her to come and her coming to his place can be a big nuisance to him at the same time; he wanted her to come maybe because she had an exciting DVD with her but he did not want her to stay long, etc. Construals may vary depending on a number of contexts and they very well coexist as our real experiences can often tell. People's psychological situation often is not a zero sum game; it is often in a foggy and complex mental condition with ambivalence or more than that. Unfortunately logical rigidity cannot be applied to real psychological phenomena; memories can be bitter or sweet, and/or bittersweet or anything else. Now consider the following:

- (13) Teachers love to have other people come in and show interest.

This sentence may not clearly be categorized either as causative or experiential or adversative; it may be construed as an extremely weak causative and weak experiential at the same time. This is often the case with quite a few constructions, not just with *have* sentences. In many cases psychological reality implies that exclusionary fallacy is at work.

6. Conclusions

Here I have tried to show the following:

1. *Have* in causative and adversative constructions does not have distinctive causative or adversative meanings but a vague idea of predetermined possession.
2. The preposition *on* has some parallelism with *have* in that it does not have distinctive meanings but some vague idea of contact.
3. *Get to* may be another manifestation of the same form with apparently distinctive meanings. Also, as a natural consequence,
4. The idea of predetermined possession may lead to that of socially predetermined possession which may well cause the idea of some socially fixed relationship. Thus there shouldn't be any resistance in the order that the causer makes against the causee and thus the smoothness may naturally emerge between causers and causees (Wierzbicka 1988; Tomozawa 2002).
5. The assumption can explain why *have* causatives cannot be passivized unlike *make*, *let*, and *get* causatives, which may indicate that predetermined possession does not involve high transitivity.
6. We have to take the idea of exclusionary fallacy into consideration when we categorize meanings.

These assumptions are highly speculative, but these speculations are not avoidable if we are serious about considering language as psychological phenomena.

Notes

- 1) The causer *he* might have done it intentionally or unintentionally. For the present unintentional reading is excluded in this paper.
- 2) Robert Sigley pointed out that (1c) may be a negative existential (non-causative) alongside with a causative construal. In this paper, however, a negative existential interpretation is not considered.
- 3) (3a) and (3b) may be ambiguous between causative and adversative interpretation, but in default cases one construal should be more preferred over the other. It often depends on your general encyclopedic knowledge of 'girlfriend', 'stranger'. See section 5. Also, as the difference between the particular sentences mainly depends not on the formal syntax but on the subject's intention, it is not possible to

posit two distinct underlying sentence structures for them.

- 4) Besides causative reading, this sentence might be interpreted as experiential as well as adversative. In my framework the latter two are not clearly distinguished on purpose: the idea of adversative may be interpreted as the negative version of experience. This may be parallel to two types of *on*: neutral effect meaning and adversative meaning. For example, *have an effect on something* and *she shut the door on me*.
- 5) Robert Sigley pointed out that *you had* may be paraphrased as *there would be*. But one expression (e.g. *you had*) must have some domain of meaning that other paraphrases cannot convey.
- 6) Robert Sigley (p.c.) suggested that a perfective *have* could perhaps be approached as event-completion converting an activity or process into a conceptual entity that is accordingly more easily conceived of as a possession. This analysis seems quite natural and worth mentioning here.
- 7) In some respects *of* may be a better parallel to *have* than *on* (p.c. Robert Sigley). But although some of the uses of *of* may imply the concept of possession, *of* is etymologically inseparable from *off* and possession meanings are only later developments; while as in the ice example, in this paper the possession meaning of *have* is assumed to be derived from holding something in hand, so that the idea of contact is assumed as with *on*.

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