

フォークランド紛争25周年記念： 帝国遺産またはPKOの予言

ギャレン ムロイ

25th Anniversary of the Falkland Islands Conflict: Imperial Legacy or Peacekeeping Prophecy ?

Garren Mulloy

Introduction

There have been a variety of opinions regarding the significance of the 1982 Falklands Conflict. These range from the effect of wars upon domestic politics, such as the ‘Falklands Factor’ in Margaret Thatcher’s 1983 re-election victory and the fall of the military dictatorship in Argentina, through to the reinforcement of international law. It has been used as an example of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations, how nations could and should act unilaterally for liberal goals, and how military capabilities require nurturing. These points were combined in the 1983 US invasion of Grenada, an act inspired by the British Falkland success, and with equally beneficial electoral results for the Reagan presidency.

For others, however, the whole Falklands conflict can be best summed up by Jorge Luis Borges comment: “like two bald men fighting over a comb.”¹ The affair was widely seen as an unnecessary relic of Britain’s imperial history, which should have been solved many years before by negotiation. The failure to do so led to significant loss of life and financial cost. More seriously, it was felt that the military victory overshadowed deep deficiencies in British policymaking and administration that have not been effectively resolved 25 years later, and that the failure to learn many of the lessons of the conflict has encouraged national leaders to overly rely upon military solutions to complex international problems.

The Falklands Conflict, unlike most other conflicts since 1945, does, however, contain many lessons for the conduct of both diplomacy and military operations in the 21st century. It demonstrated the need for seamless coordination of political, diplomatic, and military doctrines and planning, the value of formal and informal alliances and relationships, and how extended expeditionary operations are difficult to extemporize, and stretch military capabilities to breaking point. While the British were slow

¹ Barnes, Julian, *The worst reported war since the Crimean*, *The Guardian*, 25 February 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/falklands/story/0,,657871,00.html>

to learn the lessons of their own experience, it was the Falklands Conflict that encouraged many nations to think beyond the 'single scenario' Cold War defence plan and establish expeditionary capabilities that would be most fully utilized not in conflict but in peace, as the core of 'full spectrum peacekeeping'. There was also the feeling, if not immediately backed by tangible examples, that a corner had been turned in the respect for norms of international law. Unfortunately, the desire for policy 'success' does not seem to have usurped the desire to cordon off policy areas as the sole preserves of certain entities. The confusion and cacophony of a single national actor on even the most vital and central of national and international interests can still be heard, not least concerning Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007.

Summary of the conflict

Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands on 2nd April 1982, the final step in a long process of appeals and threats. The islands had exchanged hands between the French, Spanish and, finally, the British when Argentina won its independence. They (the Malvinas, in Spanish) were claimed by Argentina from 1816 until the present day, and various attempts had been made to gain control. Minor expeditions in the 1970s to small and remote island dependencies (South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands) were designed to erode British influence and claims to sole sovereignty, with the South Thule expedition existing from 1976 until late 1982. The Argentine *junta* (military government) had set the period for invasion from late 1982 to early 1983 under their *Operacion Azul* (Operation Blue), with the proviso that it could be brought forward to as early as 15th March 1982. The confused events on South Georgia, of an Argentine scrap dealer and armed military personnel defying British attempts to expel them, led to the advancement of preparations to April 1982, coinciding with a desire to distract domestic attention from an imploding economy and a bankruptcy of political legitimacy.²

The Argentines completely anticipated support from the United States, Latin America (other than Chile), and most of the United Nations General Assembly, in accord with UN Resolution 1514, on the return of all occupied colonial territories. It was expected that the British reaction would be muted and eventually lead to the ceding of the islands' sovereignty to Argentina. The responses of the European Community, and other bodies, condemning their actions completely stunned the politico-military authorities in Argentina, as did the seeming willingness of the British to actually contemplate fighting to regain the distant and near worthless islands. Operation Blue included no contingency for defending the islands against re-occupation, such had been Argentine confidence in Britain's lack of will and military ability.

² Middlebrook, Martin, *The Argentine Fight for the Falklands*, Pen and Sword Books, 2003, pp.1-26.

The British rushed a naval Task Force to the South Atlantic, mobilized merchant vessels, received the backing of the EC, NATO, the Commonwealth, and the UN (initially), and substantial semi-official aid from the US and Chile. An exclusion zone was imposed, leading to the retaking of South Georgia on 26th April and the first amphibious landing on the Falklands on 21st May. After battles in atrocious early winter conditions on land, at sea, and in the air, the Argentine forces surrendered on 14th June 1982. Both sides had lost substantial numbers of men, aircraft, and warships. The British casualties were 258 dead, the Argentines 655.³ The conflict and 'Fortress Falklands' policy since adopted has been estimated to have cost Britain approximately \$8billion from 1982 until 1988, with annual costs for the next 20 years of approximately \$200million: therefore, approximately \$12billion. This is in addition to the 'capability cost' of keeping equipment and personnel tied down in one, distant, area.

Contemporary views of the conflict were of an anachronism, an imperial legacy ("*The Empire Strikes Back*", *Newsweek*, 19th April 1982), and largely politically and militarily irrelevant to the Cold War. The notions of re-birth of British confidence or regeneration of Argentine democracy were somewhat exaggerated but nonetheless genuine in part.⁴

Lessons of the Conflict for the 21st century

The main lessons to be drawn from the Falklands Conflict can be summarized as Broad Policy Issues, and Narrow Operational Issues. In both cases, it is an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the two nations involved in conflict: how *not to* conduct policy. This may seem rather harsh upon the British, as they were 'the winners' in this conflict, but the stark truth is that the British stumbled into conflict by their own political and diplomatic inconsistencies and short-sightedness, and only just managed to defeat an enemy who performed below expectations. The British avoidance of military defeat was achieved by the narrowest of margins, and at significant cost.

For the 21st century, the Fundamental Lessons can be applied to any attempt to project foreign and defence policies beyond the boundaries of the nation state. The Lessons are both military and civilian and have not all been absorbed by the British, despite the 25th anniversary of the conflict.

Rupert Smith has explained that since 1945 the role of the 'industrial army' (the army found in the modern industrial era) has been to achieve tactical success within a pattern of strategic success, but only the Falklands Conflict united these two points. The Falkland Islands were retaken following an

³ *Falkland Islands History Roll of Honour*, UK MoD website, <http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/rollofhonour.html>; Argentine figures from Middlebrook, Martin, *The Argentine Fight for the Falklands*, pp.282-283

⁴ In Britain the events of 1982 are generally referred to as 'The Falklands War', as it is in Argentina (La Guerra de las Malvinas), whereas in most other countries it is referred to as 'The Falklands Conflict'. Both terms shall be used in this study.

illegal invasion and occupation, by Britain's 'industrial military', and the strategic *status quo* restored. All other conflicts have resulted in confusion and frustration for professional soldiers trained for such 'clean' results, with peace missions concluding either in an equivocal or at least less than perfect result.⁵ While Smith's conclusion is generally sound, it ignores one point: while Britain won a tactical success in 1982, it actually failed strategically, for it has still not produced a sustainable long-term solution for either the cause of conflict, or the prevention of a future one. In fact, the 'victory' narrowed Britain's options, for ceding sovereignty of islands it had tried to shed for twenty years to a former enemy is now an unacceptable scenario for any politician. The only victors are the Falkland Islanders.

Broad Policy Issues

1 Dealing with contentious historical issues

The British approach to the contentious issue of sovereignty forms a potentially useful case study of how *not* to negotiate and act. The British approach under both Labour and Conservative administrations was largely disinterested, lacking clear principles, and tending towards disregarding the views of those most concerned (the Falkland citizens). The British managed to turn their position of strength (sovereignty and ownership) into one of weakness (pandering to the perceived desires of the Argentines).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), while nominally charged with defending the rights of British citizens and the Crown, was rather eager to hand the islands over to Argentina. They were seen as peripheral to core British interests, likely to cause trouble (as they did) as a source of inter-state friction, expensive to support for little strategic and economic gain, and an imperial legacy best divested. The islanders were generally viewed as troublesome, constantly agitating for rights and democracy, which effectively meant no solution involving giving or leasing sovereignty to Argentina, the basic FCO policy. No other ministries or agencies were really allowed to have a say in the fate of the islands, and political statements were heavily weighted towards treating Argentina as an ally which Britain could do business with, rather than a vile, military dictatorship, that abused and murdered its own citizens and threatened its neighbours (UK and Chile) with armed invasion.

2 Preventive diplomacy in the face of 'creeping penetration'

Once again, all British governments seemed incapable of forming coherent policies or even of establishing baseline principles. There was a mixture of muted military demonstrations, civilian

⁵ Smith, Rupert, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, Penguin, London, 2006, pp. 267-278.

demonstrations, veiled threats, concessions, and a general desire not to provoke a violent reaction from Argentina. There was little attempt made to mobilise the alliances that Britain was engaged in, particularly the US 'special relationship', which was held to be equally special between Washington and Buenos Aires. Britain did so little as it had so little reason it felt to fear the Argentine threat. This was partly the result of believing one's own propaganda about 'people we can do business with', and partly the result of assigning the area such a low priority in terms of overseas intelligence (under FCO coverage, South America was given the lowest grading of any area), military intelligence (focused on Soviet and terrorist threats), and media monitoring (the General Communications Headquarters, GCHQ, under the FCO).

There was some talk at the time of the dispatch of the British Task Force that the government should have done such a thing much earlier, as a preventive deployment, and the example was raised, by former Prime Minister Jim Callaghan in the House of Commons in April 1982, of how his government had made such a deployment. The problem with his statement was that even after 25 years, it seems highly unlikely that this deployment worked. It was so secret that it seems never to have had the desired effect of deterring Argentine aggression in 1977, and that an invasion was averted due to other military and political considerations.⁶ What it did not prevent was the occupation of a Falkland Islands Dependency, South Thule, of the South Sandwich Islands in 1977, which was not 'liberated' until after the Argentine surrender on the Falklands in June 1982. The range of expert preventive military deployments by the British in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Kuwait, Oman, and Belize, simply provide the contrast of success for British failure in the 1980s.

3 Sending the wrong signals: policy cause and effect

One of the most striking aspects of the Conflict was the Argentine perception of British attitudes. The plan to withdraw the Royal Navy's (RN) *HMS Endurance* from the South Atlantic to save money, in combination with amazing offers to sell *HMS Invincible* and *HMS Fearless* to Argentina (British aircraft carrier and amphibious assault ships respectively), as well as Harrier jets and various other equipment, seemed to indicate a military in decline (*HMS Invincible* was actually contracted for sale to Australia when hostilities broke out in 1982, but the sale was cancelled due to the war).⁷ The attempts by the Foreign Office to negotiate away the Falklands, as well as political pronouncements supporting the FCO position seemed to justify the hopes that invasion would be greeted as a *fait accompli*. This was

⁶ Freedman, Lawrence, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1*, Routledge, London, 2005, pp.76-88.

⁷ Bloom, Bridget, & Newby, Patricia. *Protest as Australia buys UK carrier*, *Financial Times*, 26th February 1982, p.4; and, *Invincible Sale Offer Withdrawn*, *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, McGraw-Hill, 19th July 1982, p.19.

reinforced by British negotiation of Zimbabwean independence as part of her completion of withdrawing from empire, and negotiations with Spain over Gibraltar and Guatemala over Belize.

Each single point of British policy in its own field seemed quite sensible, but no account was taken of the cumulative effect upon perceptions of 'the national position'. There was a perception that the country was at the tail end of the de-colonization process, and the last few remnants of empire, like the Falklands, and dependant territories, were scattered about like shards of Roman pottery. Since the end of the Second World War, the British and her military had been in the process of retreat, sometimes hastened by local freedom fighters and terrorists as in Palestine, sometimes slowing to deal with such local challengers with a Westminster legacy as in Malaya and Kenya. Withdrawal came to be considered a virtue from the 1960s with the concentration of defence resources in the NATO area, a consolidation process the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, considered the accumulation of strength for the Cold War challenge, akin to Britain's concentration of naval power in Europe prior to 1914, stripping useless colonial stations to meet the rising German naval challenge.

The view from Whitehall, however, was fundamentally different to that in Buenos Aires. Where Healy saw increased strength the *junta* saw terminal weakness, and this impression was only reinforced by the sight of FCO diplomats beating a path to South America seemingly intent on ridding themselves of yet another unwanted legacy. Despite Thatcher's later gains due to her 'Falklands Factor' in the 1983 election, it was her government's decisions in 1981 to first deprive the Falkland Islanders of their British passports and then scrap the only Royal Navy ship based in the South Atlantic, that confirmed in the *junta's* consciousness that the UK was in terminal decline, and would welcome relief of the colonial burden. The passport decision had been taken by the FCO and the Home Office in light of the impending return of Hong Kong to China, and the desire to prevent Hong Kong British citizens from returning to the 'motherland' rather than enjoy the indulgence of the People's Republic. There had been no consideration of the effects elsewhere, certainly not of depriving 2000 Falkland Islanders of their rights. The decision to scrap *HMS Endurance* had been taken to save money, an amazing decision with hindsight, considering the cost of the war, but also at the time it was unusual in that the amount estimated to be saved being only approximately £4million (approximately \$8million) per year, out of a defence budget of almost £16billion. What was even more extraordinary was that *HMS Endurance* was offered for sale in 1981 to Brazil, an ally of Argentina and supporter of her Malvinas claim.⁸

If these signals were not clear enough to a pro-active military dictatorship, and a strong public belief in the justice of Argentina's claim to the islands, the occupation of South Thule in 1977, and, most significantly, the complete failure of the UK to either expel the invaders or even lodge sufficiently strong

⁸ Freedman, Lawrence, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1*, Routledge, London, 2005, p.146.

and sustained protests (either unilaterally or through the UN), convinced policy makers that the British would not resist. If the invasion came as a shock to the British in April 1982, they only had themselves to blame.

4 Matching ‘commitments’, ‘resolve’, and ‘capabilities’

Britain had many ‘residual commitments’ in this post-imperial period, but did not take such commitments seriously. There was little political or official recognition of what such commitments really entailed, and there was a noticeable lack of resolve to meet such commitments, particularly in sanctioning action or budgets. While the military staff made some plans for possible defences and re-invasions of the Falklands, these were never ‘mainstreamed’ so that the final Task Force deployment had little reference to any planning body and was a last minute dash. The basis of British planning was essentially a ‘one scenario strategy’: the Soviet invasion of Western Europe with conventional forces. Gibraltar, Hong Kong, the Falklands, and other territories, were only considered as detractors from the ‘main effort’ of NATO, except where considered useful to other British considerations. Belize was seen as something of an asset, as the US was keen on the UK presence in a region they considered under communist threat from Cuba and Nicaragua. The UK saw it as a good training ground for anti-terrorist operations, and for anti-drug operations in the Caribbean.

The Falklands were considered indefensible, and assessments made from the 1950s until 1982 confirmed this. The basing of aircraft, large land forces, or a naval force was seen as out of proportion both to the risk and the population. At the same time the conventional aircraft carrier force had been scrapped in the late 1970s, much to Buenos Aires delight, and the only scenario provided by the Royal Navy for its maintenance had been a seemingly fanciful war near Indonesia!⁹ The 1981 Defence White Paper proposed major cuts to the Navy, with the new, smaller carriers (*Invincible* class) being reduced from 3 to 2 ships, the old *HMS Hermes* and *HMS Bulwark* carriers being sold, the amphibious landing capability being seriously reduced (see below), as would the frigate and destroyer forces. It was being proposed that Britain’s residual commitments could be covered by the very tightly stretched forces already marked for NATO and Northern Ireland service, and barely able to cover British commitments in Europe and the North Atlantic. The situation in 1982 was not dissimilar to 1939, when the British government hoped that the guarantees to defend France, Poland, and the empire would never be called upon. Relying upon hope and the good offices of dictators is never likely to be a sustainable policy, yet the vanity of significant (if not great) power status, the lack of urgency in resolving the anachronistic commitments of a previous age, and the paucity of politically ‘cheap’ alternatives resulted in just such a

⁹ Healey, Denis, *The Time of My Life*, Penguin, London, 1990, pp.275-276.

policy.

5 Defence Diplomacy

This is one area where British long-term efforts paid off. The extremely close relationship between the US Department of Defense (DoD) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) enabled UK forces access to US facilities at Ascension Island (vital for logistics for the South Atlantic), as well as intelligence and weaponry (especially the latest AIM-9L Sidewinder missile) without which they probably would not have won in 1982. Chile, Canada, France, New Zealand, and Australia also provided support, with both human and signals intelligence.¹⁰ Thatcher became indebted to President Mitterand for the French intelligence assistance to limiting Argentine attempts at bolstering their arsenal (see below), and the decades of cultivating defence and intelligence ties with NATO, Commonwealth, and other countries paid great dividends. Chile, an old British ally, returned a supply ship recently purchased from the RN, and engaged in large scale naval manoeuvres to unbalance the intelligence picture, indirectly threatening the southern flank where Argentina had concentrated her air and naval forces.

6 Formal and Informal Alliance Diplomacy

One of the most surprising developments for Argentina was the unity of the European Community (EC) behind Britain. Germany, France and Italy were significant arms suppliers to Argentina, which had close relations with Spain, yet Britain managed to not only to obtain comprehensive EC sanctions against Argentina, but also significant French intelligence assistance in preventing Argentina buying military spare parts, and especially the Exocet missiles, that even in small numbers destroyed two British ships. The assistance provided by President Mitterand to Prime Minister Thatcher in these intelligence matters was one factor in the thawing of relations between the British government and the EC, culminating in movement towards a single EC market, the transformation to the EU, and the single market under the Treaty of Maastricht.

Even more intriguing was the changing flavour of the Anglo-American 'special relationship', and the even more complex relationship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher. Below Reagan, who remained coolly detached, to Thatcher's fury, until 30th April, the US administration was essentially split in two. The State Department realized it was between two rocks and a hard place, as it valued the relationship with Britain, not least for its steadfast support for US nuclear forces in Europe, and Reagan's resurgent anti-Communist foreign policy, but it had treated the Argentines as their valued protégé in South America. Argentine personnel had been trained by US special forces and the CIA, and

¹⁰ West, Nigel, *The Secret War for the Falklands*, Time Warner, London, 1998.

had engaged in extensive operations in Central America against Nicaraguan and Salvadorian guerrillas. Thus Secretary of State Alexander Hague's fence sitting was highly understandable, as was London's frustration. This was made all the more difficult to accept given that the DoD under Casper Weinberger made every effort to help the British forces, with arms, fuel, base facilities, and even an extraordinary offer to loan the RN a USN aircraft carrier, should the British lose one of their two vessels: "we should supply them with everything they needed."¹¹

The abiding lesson for the British of the war was that they should never attempt a major conflict without the US allied, uncontroversially, behind the UK. This has shaped British strategic thinking since 1945, but the initial wavering in Washington, and later reliance on DoD assistance merely reinforced it, and can be seen in unquestioning UK alliance with the US in the Gulf War, air operations over Iraq, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. Even when British governments have disagreed with Washington and agreed with their European allies, the result, as in Kosovo, has always been to try and bring the Americans along, rather than act without them. Without DoD cooperation it seems certain that Britain would have lost the Falklands War in 1982.

7 Living with the consequences of policy: post-conflict costs and commitments

While the conflict was expensive for both sides it had deeper consequences. Neither side has felt able to concede any points in preliminary negotiations on the Falklands, and the South Atlantic 'cold war' continues. Britain remains tied to a costly 'Fortress Falklands' policy it can't see any real alternative to, while Argentine desires remain frustrated and the sense of injustice for its cause is still widely felt in society.

Conflict in the South Atlantic, as in most cases, has proven not to have resolved anything. The victory was almost as hollow as defeat for policymakers, beyond the immediate hubris of parades and elections, and destroyed the Conservative government's defence cuts and restructuring plans, as well as its strictly monetarist economic macro-management strategy. The financial consequences of victory have been outlined, but there have been other consequences of greater import. The Falklands campaign raised the bar for policy makers and the military. While there had long been pride in the British armed forces, they were now held up to be capable of practically anything, even when faced with impossible odds, appalling conditions and poor equipment. Slowly under Thatcher, and then more rapidly under Major and particularly Blair, the British armed forces became the crux of British policy. It was felt that while the UK could no longer hack it as a great power, its military capabilities and fame would allow it to punch above its weight on the world stage: a medium-weight among the heavy weights. The

¹¹ Freedman, Lawrence, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 2*, Routledge, London, 2005, pp.381-383

consequences of this approach have been felt for two decades, with British forces being stretched extremely thinly all over the world in a massive range of operations right across the military and political spectrum.

It is not possible to assert that the Falklands War in any way ‘led to’ the Middle Eastern wars or peacekeeping missions since then, but the course and result of the war has encouraged successive British governments to embark upon increasingly risky military adventures, without providing the resources to sustain the forces that have become pivotal to not only Britain’s defence, but also her foreign policies.

Narrow Operational Issues

1 Intelligence: the effect upon policy making, force configuration, and training

The failure of both British and Argentine intelligence was significant. The British have often been excused for having ‘too many balls in the air’, of being too concerned with other higher priorities to notice a cold corner of South America. Argentina was seen as single-scenario focused and naïvely optimistic in the righteousness of its cause.

The quotation below may seem appropriate:

First, intelligence analysts failed to place their assessment ... in a strategic and political context and try to understand the motivations, intentions and interests of (the) ... government.

Second, and perhaps central to our intelligence failure, intelligence community analysts ... narrowly pursued only one working hypothesis.

Finally, analysts failed to convey explicitly to policy makers the ambiguity of their evidence and the reality that their conclusions were far from an analytical “slam dunk.”¹²

That this quotation refers to the intelligence basis for the Iraq War suggests that much has yet to be learned by politicians and intelligence operatives. The Falklands provides a classic example of how not to prepare for either invasion or defence.

2 Preparing capabilities to match standing commitments

The politicians, officials and militaries of both sides failed to take seriously the commitments placed upon them. The British government planned to sell off the residual amphibious assault capability and concentrate its budget on specifically Western European defence related capabilities. Amphibious warfare would be conducted on a limited scale, under shore-based air cover, from civilian merchant

¹² Tracey, Richard S, *Trapped by a Mindset: the Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure*, 23 January 2007, *Air & Space Power Journal*, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/tracey.html>

shipping requisitioned by the state. That only the Royal Marines and one limited section of the Royal Navy protested seemed to vindicate a political decision motivated by economic stringency. This seemed a reversion to the mindset that proved so disastrous in the 1940 attempt to prevent the fall of Norway, and yet fittingly the residual amphibious capability was assigned the defence of NATO's northern flank in Norway.

However, the armed forces also failed to provide even some of the most basic commitments to military professionalism, equipping troops with equipment known to be inadequate, hoping this would never be shown in combat, as resources were funnelled towards the high profile 'kit' of submarines, tanks, and mach 2 fighters. The Falklands were never on the agenda for the armed forces, not even the RN. The RN, RAF, and Army concentrated their energies, attentions, and spending on those high profile, single scenario, NATO specific roles that were apparent to their political masters. Any 'out of area' operations were to be covered by 'the slack'; spare capacity able to be used for odd jobs with inappropriate equipment and no specific training. This was a gamble of faith and expectation, and was to be repeated in the expeditionary operations of the 1990s, as British forces would be expected to operate in all climates, and at all levels of intensity with equipment and training designed for defending German plains. It is extraordinary that the British army did not de-brief any commanders from the war: their experiences were simply not considered relevant to 'real soldiering' in the NATO area.¹³ This was the mindset that had contributed to the war by failing to prepare for it.

3 The need for continuous contingency planning

Both sides failed in their planning efforts. The British failed to include all three services in their planning, and did not widely circulate plans for constructive engagement among the services and arms. The Argentines, amazingly, failed to consider the possibility that invasion would lead to a British military response. There was such a narrow pool of personnel involved in the Argentine planning staff, with no checking process or 'critical cell' of independent checking officers, that there were no alternative or critical views available, therefore no-one to point out the massive and highly dangerous risks being run. The Argentine military was effectively completely detached from political and strategic realities, and therefore was wasting its time on the tactical plans. No matter what happened tactically there could be no strategic success, as there was no strategic plan, or even appreciation of the need for one. Soldiers and sailors had taken over the political process and therefore could not understand that the political process had any role to play operations. This was the blindness to democratic imperatives in modern international relations.

¹³ Bicheno, Hugh, *Razor's Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War*, Phoenix, London, 2007. p.331.

4 The requirements for a 'joint effort': Jointery

Both nations made only limited progress to encourage joint operational practices in their armed forces. The Argentines were particularly inept, staging a naval invasion, with almost no air force or army input, then essentially leaving the two other services to fight the conflict. The British had a degree of cooperation, but inevitably there were conflicts between the Army and Royal Marines over priorities, the RN insisted it was in charge, which the RAF resisted. At least the British did learn this one lesson, and have gradually become one of the most 'joint' minded militaries in the world. The situation was reached by the end of the 1990s when there would be practically no aspect of British defence that would not be 'joint', not only in appearance but also in very real doctrinal and operational senses.¹⁴

Fundamental Lessons for the 21st Century

1 Security Policy as a Joint Effort

The Falklands Conflict shows most clearly that while political, official, and military levels may pursue different aspects of security policy, the inter-dependency is so great that there is no room for domestic rivalries and separate agendas. Mixed messages can lead to dangerous misconceptions on the part of competitors and allies alike. In certain countries there is a healthy concern with 'civilian control' of militaries, but with consequent under-appreciation of the importance of 'civilian-military cooperation'. This is often seen in relation to intelligence analysis and ignorance of professional advice.

2 Intelligence as a Joint Effort

The importance of 'civilian-military cooperation' in intelligence work is matched by the need for a sanitized, de-politicized, professional assessment unit for providing intelligence reports. The British JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) has been widely held up as one of the best examples of such a unit, but the problems of JIC in predicting the Falklands invasion, as well as in the build up to the Gulf and Iraqi Wars, illustrate that even the best models require continuous monitoring and refining. Britain's ability to contribute intelligence to peacekeeping and other forms of expeditionary operation has been greatly valued, particularly in terms of HUMSEC, human security provided by experienced personnel with deep local knowledge. The skills of the UK and US militaries could be potentially complementary given the HUMSEC skills of the former and the SIGINT capabilities of the latter, and these were apparent in 1982. In intelligence, as in most fields, the value of allies is extremely important even if not always immediately apparent.

¹⁴ For UK 'Jointery' see Mulloy, Garren, *A British Way in War and Peace: UK Post-Cold War Defence Reform* (JAIS *Journal of International Security*, 2001, 29/3, in Japanese).

3 The Value of Allies

The Falklands showed how Britain's formal and informal, hard and soft power allies greatly assisted her victory. In other forms of operation, whether preventive deployments, peacekeeping, or intensive operations, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, the role of allies has been vital in sustaining military, political, and diplomatic efforts. Allies can offer both niche military capabilities, and niche diplomatic connections to augment ones own capabilities, and are vital in preventing institutional isolation in the age of progressive global governance. Even 'full spectrum' or 'broad spectrum' actors, such as the US and UK, lack certain niche skills, such as the bush skills of Australian forces, so useful in building relations with tribal chiefs in Somalia, or the community support skills of the Swedish forces in Lebanon and the Japanese in Iraq. Allies are also vital for informing a government that it is embarked upon a misguided policy. Argentina's lack of such allies in 1982 was to her shame. It remains to be seen whether Britain has since proved a worthy ally of the US.

4 Contingency Planning for Commitments

Every level of government needs to plan seriously for a range of contingencies emanating from policy commitments. There should be a multiplicity of planning efforts, to ensure that single-scenario attitudes are avoided, yet all planning should be guided by common core doctrine. No plan should become the 'property' of any single person or agency, nor should any plan be seen as ever 'complete' or 'finished'. The range of contingencies to be matched should also be echoed in the training, equipment, and configuration of available resources, both military and civilian, and planning scenarios should be practiced by as many levels of personnel as possible.

Examples of this include the dispatch of peacekeepers being accompanied by the training of various units to constitute an extraction force, even while the PKO is of the classical blue beret variety. It also is pertinent for all levels of civilian and military command to cooperate in such planning exercises, and become accustomed to adapt to rapidly changing political and military environments. There should be no commitments without the capabilities to fulfil them: human, financial, and political. This needs to be recognized at all levels, civilian and military.

5 Realistic Expeditionary Capabilities

A military which has little or no expeditionary capability in the 21st century is little more than a border guard force, and consequently of little value to international relations. A military with expeditionary capability must not only have the ability to move rapidly over great distances, it must be able to adapt quickly and establish a capability in the local environment. The local environment may be harsh or benign, with this being determined by factors such as weather, conflict, culture, and politics.

Expeditionary capability relies upon adaptability to such factors, and therefore a broad range of skills and experience, including in non-military fields.

The expeditionary capability must also be sustained, either locally or from the home or allied base, and this entails a significant logistical operation, which is likely to include a significant civilian element. Therefore, civilian-military operating norms need to be established and practiced. Britain was uniquely well equipped for the Falklands in this respect, as it retained a significant merchant marine (since badly depleted), which it was able to call-up for service, as well as a large and capable logistics train owned by the Royal Navy: the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Appreciating the value of the RFA, it has been expanded since 1982, with more and far more complex and capable vessels.

Such are the limitations of distance and environment that the government dispatching such forces needs to either delegate local command and control to a local national or allied commander, or else dispatch a civilian representative to lead the mission. Local conditions require local command and control, rather than global attempts at real-time micro-management and the consequent risks of 'structural compression' (when layers of command and control are not allowed to exercise their operational roles due to the overbearing actions of the executive levels of government). The British performed quite well in this respect in the Falklands (partly due to poor communications), the Argentines disastrously. Fear of exercising independent command and initiative was as debilitating as enemy action.

6 Media Engagement and Management

The Falklands showed that attempting to micro-manage media coverage would be of benefit to nobody. Propaganda and censorship efforts by either side spread nothing but disdain for politicians and broadcasters, and one commentator regarded this as, "the worst reported war since the Crimean."¹⁵ Where journalists were trusted and engaged with, the trust was reciprocated and provided for better coverage of the conflict, and a more manageable relationship for commanders in the field. This was taken progressively further in the Gulf and Iraq Wars, leading to 'embedding' of journalists. However, in 2003, this concept was the victim of further 'official' efforts to micro-manage journalists, with the result that 'embedded reports' were treated with some caution. More recent BBC and Sky reports from Afghanistan, and press coverage from Iraq, suggest that a position of embedding as a relationship can be salvaged.

Media coverage is seen as vital to certain missions. This may be mistaken. However, the denial of media access will inevitably lead to suspicion and adverse reporting, not least due to the difficulty of

¹⁵ Barnes, Julian, *The worst reported war since the Crimean*, *The Guardian*, 25 February 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/falklands/story/0,,657871,00.html>

obtaining accurate data. The political danger of the all-pervasive media presence is that policy could be modified based upon the latest images, sounds, or stories, rather than sound doctrine and principles applied to situations. US responses in Somalia give rise to these fears, as do the results from Iraq.

7 Mental Health

One of the most shocking results of the Falklands War on both sides has been the lack of care for veterans. The US government commissioned National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study reported in 1988 that 15.2% of male veterans suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and that over 30% had suffered at some time since returning from Vietnam, 35.8% with PTSD for those closest to combat operations. However, in 2003 a re-analysis of data by the Matsunaga Vietnam Veterans Project found that, “a large majority of Vietnam veterans struggled with chronic PTSD symptoms, with four out of five reporting recent symptoms when interviewed 20-25 years after Vietnam.”¹⁶ In 1982, the British armed forces had scarcely heard of PTSD and despite compelling evidence throughout the 1980s, there was no official recognition of PTSD among Falkland veterans.¹⁷ This situation only changed in the aftermath of the Iraq War, when the huge increase in PTSD casualties prompted an MoD review, so that 20 year PTSD sufferers have been able to gain treatment.¹⁸ The South Atlantic Medal Association, the Falkland veterans group, has asserted that more British veterans have committed suicide through neglected PTSD suffering than died in the conflict, with the number estimated at over 300.¹⁹ The plight of the Argentine veterans is widely recognised as much worse, with social stigma and little or now welfare services for them, they “were treated like a contagious disease by their own authorities and shunned by the public.”²⁰

¹⁶ Price, Jennifer L, *Findings from the National Vietnam Veterans' Readjustment Study*, United States Department of Veteran Affairs, http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact_shts/fs_nvvr.html?opm=1&rr=rr45&srt=d&echor=true

¹⁷ Shephard, Ben, *A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists 19-14-1994*, Pimlico, London, 2002, pp.377-384; Jones, E & Wessely, S, *Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War*, Psychology Press, 2005.

¹⁸ Briggs, Billy, *Mindfield*, *The Scotsman*, 7th September 2007, <http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/magazine.cfm?id=1418842007>

¹⁹ BBC News, *Falkland veterans claim suicide toll*, 13th January 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1758301.stm; Sengupta, Kim, *Falklands ceremony is too late for 'abandoned' veterans*, *The Independent*, 18 June 2007 http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/this_britain/article2669924.ece

²⁰ Bicheno, Hugh, *Razor's Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War*, Phoenix, London, 2007. p.330.

Conclusion

The Falklands War was a 'one off', an anachronism, and for the youth of Britain and Argentina probably seems as distant as the colonial wars in previous centuries. After 25 years, fundamental questions remain. How could the Argentine government, a collection of some of the brightest men of a cultured nation, have been so incredibly wrong? How could the British have been so palpably misguided to pander to the whims of this government for so long? How could two countries spend so much in blood and treasure for something so peripheral to their national interests?

We cannot completely answer these questions, but we can draw lessons for the 21st century. Every nation with commitments must be willing and able to exercise its responsibilities to fulfil those commitments. In the Falklands, these commitments were both political and military. Similarly today, many nations have made political and military commitments beyond their core national interests. Danish and Korean troops serve in Iraq, Dutch and German troops in Afghanistan, Indians in Liberia, Italians in Congo, Japanese in Lebanon. Do their governments have the will to meet these commitments? The US withdrew from Somalia when challenged, and many other governments have shown themselves reluctant to spend lives and money on defending the rights of other peoples to live in peace, despite commitments to international law. The Falklands War provides an example of how Britain stood by its commitments, eventually, after decades of neglect, and abuse of its own citizens' rights and demands, under extreme provocation. This proved something of a model for future British practice, with the result that British forces are being over-utilized as the primary tool of foreign policy. This may not be a model that others will wish to follow, but it does ask questions of the utility of peacekeeping if contributing states are *not* willing to match their resources to their commitments.

The Falklands War may provide examples of how not to conduct diplomacy, how not to invade a country, and how not to treat one's own citizens, particularly veterans of conflict. It does, however, provide us with the salutary example of how democratic process and international law eventually prevailed. It is hoped that present peacekeeping and nation building missions meet with similar success despite the many obstacles.

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